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MASTER PROJECT – Communication Systems Group, Prof. Dr. Burkhard Stiller

Design and Prototypical Implementation of Decentralised Federated Object Detection

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Declaration of Independence

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Abstract

Federated learning has emerged as a promising distributional paradigm for training machine learning models on distributed data. In the fully decentralised setting, the central aggregation server is removed and participants coordinate through direct peer-to-peer communication. However, existing work on decentralised federated learning for computer vision remains fragmented and difficult to compare, with several aspects underrepresented in reproducible, benchmarkable implementations. This thesis addresses this gap by presenting the design and prototypical implementation of an object detection module, built upon the decentralised federated learning platform *FLyra*, together with a structured validation and evaluation. The framework implementation is based on YOLOv5 and the COCO benchmark dataset. To bound decentralised behaviour, the evaluation establishes centralised single-node proxy baselines in both a full-data setting and a corresponding partial-data setting that reflects the federation-representative data fraction. A trivial decentralised run with $N = 4$ nodes serves as an additional reference and the federation baseline. These foundational benchmarks are complemented by targeted evaluations of various topologies and a watermarking attack scenario affecting a single node in the federation. All conducted experiments serve as a proof of concept for the implementation and focus on early-stage optimisation behaviour in relative terms. Overall, the experiments show that aggregated performance remains consistently bounded by the established single-node references, irrespective of topology or the attack. For the small federation setup ($N = 4$) under the compute- and round-limited conditions of this study, topology influences inter-node variance and early convergence behaviour, but has a smaller effect on the final performance reached within the evaluated horizon. In the watermarking scenario, the influence of the malicious node is dampened at the aggregated level and does not transfer as a stable artefact, although overall utility is reduced and detection remains limited under the applied aggregation scheme.

Föderales Lernen hat sich als vielversprechendes Verteilungsparadigma für das Training von Maschinellen Lernmodellen auf verteilten Daten herausgestellt. In einer vollständig dezentralisierten Umgebung wird der zentrale Aggregationsserver entfernt und die Teilnehmer koordinieren sich über direkte Peer-to-Peer-Kommunikation. Allerdings sind die bisherigen Arbeiten zum dezentralisierten föderierten Lernen für Computer Vision nach wie vor fragmentiert und schwer zu vergleichen, wobei mehrere Aspekte in reproduzierbaren, benchmarkfähigen Implementierungen unterrepräsentiert sind. Diese Arbeit schließt diese Lücke, indem sie das Design und die prototypische Implementierung eines Objekterkennungsmoduls präsentiert, das auf der dezentralisierten föderierten Lernplattform *FLyra* basiert, zusammen mit einer expermimentbasierten Validierung. Die Framework-Implementierung basiert auf YOLOv5 und dem COCO-Benchmark-Datensatz.

Um das dezentrale Verhalten einzugrenzen, werden bei der Evaluation zentralisierte Single-Node-Proxy-Baselines sowohl in einer Voll-Daten-Referenz als auch in einer entsprechenden Teil-Daten-Referenz festgelegt, die den für die Föderation repräsentativen Datenanteil widerspiegelt. Ein trivialer dezentraler Lauf mit $N = 4$ Knoten dient als zusätzliche Referenz und als Basis für die Föderation. Diese grundlegenden Benchmarks werden durch gezielte Bewertungen verschiedener Topologien und ein Wasserzeichen-Angriffsszenario ergänzt, das einen einzelnen Knoten in der Föderation betrifft. Alle durchgeführten Experimente dienen als Proof of Concept für die Implementierung und konzentrieren sich auf das Optimierungsverhalten in der frühen Phase in relativer Hinsicht. Insgesamt zeigen die Experimente, dass die aggregierte Leistung unabhängig von der Topologie oder dem Angriff durch die festgelegten Referenzwerte für einzelne Knoten konsistent begrenzt bleibt. Bei der kleinen Netzwerkkonfiguration ($N = 4$) unter den in dieser Studie festgelegten Bedingungen hinsichtlich Rechenleistung und Rundenzahl beeinflusst die Topologie die Varianz zwischen den Knoten und das frühe Konvergenzverhalten, hat jedoch einen geringeren Einfluss auf die innerhalb des bewerteten Zeitraums erreichte Endleistung. Im Wasserzeichen-Szenario wird der Einfluss des bösartigen Knotens auf aggregierter Ebene gedämpft und nicht als stabiles Artefakt übertragen, obwohl die Gesamtleistung verringert ist und die Erkennung unter dem angewandten Aggregationsschema begrenzt bleibt.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Chao Feng of the Communication Systems Group for the continued support throughout the project in the form of guidance, ideation, and feedback. Furthermore, a core part of this work builds on the *FLyra* platform, which was envisioned and developed at the Communication Systems Group prior to the work presented here.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Motivation

Federated learning *(FL)* has attracted increasing attention in both academia and industry as a means to address the challenges associated with distributed data and emerging data protection laws. According to Emergen Research [27], the global market for FL was valued at USD 132 million in March 2024 and is projected to reach USD 352.9 million by 2033. This growth reflects the pressing need for federated machine learning solutions across various sectors including healthcare, finance, and autonomous systems.

Nevertheless, crucial gaps remain in the existing body of work on federated object detection *(FOD)*. First, a considerable portion of the existing vision-based FL research is related to image classification as a prototypical task in many machine learning *(ML)* settings. Second, the role of network topology in convergence dynamics and model performance in FOD is not well documented. Third, the resilience of FOD systems against malicious participants who may introduce poisoned data or model updates has not been explored in depth. Generally, the field of exploration in DFOD is immense and many unexplored areas remain.

These gaps motivate this study, which aims to extend an existing decentralised federated learning *(DFL)* framework *FLyra* with object detection *(OD)* specific functionalities. Through this extension, this work provides a prototypical toolbox to study such settings in various configurations. Beyond the architectural contribution, preliminary empirical insights are reported regarding the general trade-off between centralised OD and the federated counterpart, impacts of trivial watermarking imitating a malicious federation participant, and the influence of varying network topologies. Collectively, these results inform further targeted studies with an easily configurable and extendable foundation.

1.2 Description of Work

This thesis makes the following contributions to the field of DFL:

First, regarding framework design and implementation, extensions to the *FLyra* platform are proposed. The extensions make it possible to perform decentralised federated object detection *(DFOD)* with the support of various network topologies and attack modules. This includes the integration of an OD pipeline with associated models and data-loaders, as well utility extensions for improved user experience *(UX)*.

Second, a systematic evaluation of different training strategies is conducted to identify a suitable baseline for subsequent experiments. The comparison considers convergence behaviour and stability across different initialisations.

Third, different experiments regarding federation and topology are conducted. A comprehensive evaluation of four network topologies (fully connected, ring, star, and random) is conducted in terms of convergence speed, final model performance, and inter-node variance to characterise how these topologies influence training dynamics.

Lastly, an adversarial robustness analysis is carried out. On this basis this work evaluates the potentially inherent resilience of the federated framework against backdoor attacks, where a malicious node injects watermarked samples into the local training data. Both single-class and multi-class targeting is evaluated quantifying adversarial impacts in terms of global performance impact and watermark persistence in aggregated models.

1.3 Thesis Outline

Chapter 2 provides the necessary background on OD and FL paradigms, as well as decentralised communication topologies. The theoretical foundations upon which the subsequent design decisions are based are established in this chapter. Chapter 3 surveys related work in FL, with particular emphasis on FOD and robustness against adversarial participants. Gaps in the existing literature that motivate the contributions of this thesis are identified. Chapter 4 describes the extension of *FLyra*. The system components, including the overarching architecture, the model design, aggregation algorithms, and attack modules, are detailed.

Chapter 5 presents preliminary experiments that inform the choice of training configurations for the main evaluation. Specifically, pretrained and randomly initialised models are compared, the impact of layer freezing is investigated, and the scalability of the approach to distributed settings is validated. Chapter 6 contains the main experimental evaluation. The performance of different network topologies is assessed and the impact of backdoor attacks on system robustness is investigated. Comprehensive metrics, including Mean Average Precision *(mAP)* and test loss are reported. Chapter 7 discusses the implications of the empirical testing for DFOD in the given settings, outlining key takeaways for further related research and practical application. Chapter 8 summarises the thesis. Limitations of the current work are discussed, and directions for future research in DFOD are outlined.

Chapter 2

Background

This work builds on two fundamental concepts in machine learning: the computer vision task of OD and the distributional paradigm of DFL. This chapter provides essential background on both topics and introduces the key terminology and design considerations referenced throughout this thesis.

2.1 Object Detection

OD occupies a prominent position within the machine learning community. It addresses a task that is intuitive for humans yet computationally challenging, with applications across diverse computer vision domains. At its core, OD is a supervised learning task that extends object classification by not only recognizing predefined object classes in an image but also localising them with axis-aligned bounding boxes [73]. Accordingly, an OD model requires some form of localisation and classification mechanisms. These can be implemented either in classical two-stage detectors which, as the name suggests, first propose regions for consideration that are then classified, or as one-stage detectors that compress these steps into a single pass [45].

OD has been shaped by several key advancements that have driven the research in the field. In 2012, [32] presented a Convolutional Neural Network *(CNN)* architecture pioneering a new approach to image analysis and classification as an essential component thereof. As a consequence, CNNs and related variants dominated the academic and competitive landscape in the 2010s [24, 20, 56, 58]. The success in image classification of CNNs has transferred over to OD. Initially with region-based CNNs *(R-CNNs)* [16] and its direct successors: Fast R-CNN [15] and Faster R-CNN [53]. These early two-stage detectors introduced a region proposal stage followed by classification and bounding box regression, achieving then state-of-the-art *(SoTA)* accuracy but at the expense of computational efficiency. This trade-off motivated subsequent research into real-time and single-stage detection frameworks. As two-stage detectors often outperform single-stage counterparts in *experimental* accuracy [45], research continues in domains where some computational efficiency can be sacrificed for marginal gains, such as autonomous driving [41] or medical imaging [8].

Single-stage methodologies reformulate the detection problem as a direct regression task. This approach was first applied by [51] in their seminal work on *You Only Look Once (YOLO)*. Crucially, a single forward pass, and thus a single optimisation objective, is sufficient to jointly predict bounding boxes and class probabilities [51]. This unifies localisation and classification while enabling efficient inference, making such architectures attractive for real-time applications.

With the transfer of transformer-based models from computational linguistics to computer vision, coined *Vision Transformer*, originally proposed by [30], the range of OD models has been increased greatly. These attention-based models excel at capturing long-range dependencies and global context [64], which, with regards to OD, can be of great use since it allows to easily handle objects of various sizes in even very cluttered scenes matching or even outperforming CNN-based models [38]. While such transformer-based models have become competitive with CNNs, this work focuses on CNN-derived approaches, thus further details are omitted here.

2.2 Federated Learning

Traditional machine learning typically requires vast amounts of centrally located data. However, in numerous practical applications, data remains distributed across multiple entities due to privacy considerations or logistical constraints, such as the substantial energy requirements associated with transferring exabytes of data between locations [47]. [42] emphasise that the rapid increase in data generated by IoT devices makes centralisation impractical, further motivating the development and adoption of a federated approach. Moreover, the sharing of sensitive data is restricted by regulatory frameworks such as the GDPR [13] and the EU AI Act [52], which impose strict requirements on data privacy and security.

FL is a distributed machine learning paradigm that enables multiple clients to collaboratively train a model without sharing their local data [37]. This approach to distributed optimisation was first introduced by [31] and subsequently refined by [43] in 2017, who proposed an effective method for training deep neural networks through iterative model averaging across clients. The implementation of FL requires establishing node connectivity, defining communication protocols, developing strategies for propagating model updates throughout the federation, and specifying aggregation methods. The following subsections introduce the main methodological paradigms of FL and summarise common design dimensions, including aggregation, topology, and synchronisation.

2.2.1 Centralised vs Decentralised Federated Learning

Centralised FL relies on a single orchestration server to construct and distribute a global model to all participants. In practice, each client first trains its own model on local data, then transmits the resulting parameter updates to the central server, which aggregates and merges these individual updates to form an updated global model [6].

DFL gained attention in 2018 by decentralising the aggregation of model updates across peer participants [22]. In this paradigm, each node computes updates locally, including model weights, gradients, and associated metadata like activation functions, and then shares these with other nodes in the federation [6]. By removing the need for a single orchestration server, DFL addresses the single point-of-failure issue as nodes can continuously update their knowledge about active nodes. Distributing aggregation responsibility across nodes rather than relying on one server dilutes central trust dependencies and substantially reduces the risk of a single targeted attack [6]. Furthermore, communication overhead and the workload are distributed more evenly among nodes, reducing congestion and latency that typically arise when many clients all interact with one central server. On top of that, new participants can join and immediately engage in training and thus contribute to model performance. [6] stress that DFL improves resource efficiency by spreading the computational burden of aggregating model updates across all participating nodes rather than relying on a single, centralised parameter server. Lastly, such decentralised setups give rise to privacy preserving methods for knowledge sharing, though these are not of primary concern to the work at hand.

However, these advantages come with several challenges. DFL can incur significant communication overhead, depending on the topology and the frequency of peer-to-peer exchanges [72]. The absence of a central server can lead to inconsistencies, particularly among clients with heterogeneous dataset sizes, computational resources, and network capabilities [72]. Additionally, [72] highlight that DFL environments are more susceptible to attacks from malicious nodes, as detecting such adversaries is inherently more difficult.

2.2.2 Aggregation

In both DFL and centralised FL, two principal classes of models are employed. The first class comprises local models, which reside on individual participating nodes and are trained exclusively on each node's local subset of data, thereby capturing patterns inherent to that specific subdataset. The second class is the global model, which is obtained by integrating the local models through well-established aggregation methods. The global model reflects the collective knowledge distilled from all participating nodes [57].

[43] introduced a widely used algorithm called *FedAvg*. The centralised approach starts by distributing a global model to a selected subset of clients, each of which trains the model locally on its data. After local training, clients transmit their updated model parameters back to the central server, along with the sizes of their local datasets. The server then computes a weighted average of these parameters to produce an updated global model for the next iteration [43]. [57] introduce *DFedAvg*, a fully decentralised variant of *FedAvg* in which model aggregation is performed via peer-to-peer averaging over an undirected graph rather than through a central server. In this scheme, each node broadcasts its local updates to its neighbours and then refines its model by averaging the parameters it receives from them.

2.2.3 Topology

Topology refers to the underlying communication structure within a distributed system that determines how nodes within the system are interconnected [29]. This concept is primarily relevant for DFL settings, where coordination does not rely on a centralised orchestrating server. From a task-agnostic perspective, topology is a system-level design choice rather than an inherent property of a DFL problem, acting as a meta-configuration influencing how nodes interact and how updates propagate. This work considers *connected, bidirectional* graphs as valid network topologies ensuring eventual reachability of all nodes. Common structured patterns include *ring* [62], *mesh* [29] and *fully-connected* networks, however, any random setup under the mentioned connectivity and directionality assumption is applicable.

2.2.4 Synchronisation

Another common consideration in FL is network synchronisation. Synchronisation strategies determine how and when nodes exchange and aggregate updates. In a synchronous scheme, all nodes (or all neighbours in a given topology) must complete their local training before aggregation proceeds, ensuring consistency but potentially being slowed down by stragglers [29]. In contrast, asynchronous schemes allow nodes to transmit updates as soon as they are ready, improving efficiency but potentially introducing stale information into the global model [29]. Semi-asynchronous approaches exist that aim to balance these trade-offs via bounded staleness, where updates are committed once a sufficient subset of nodes completes or if a given time-window elapses [75]. While these elements are crucial in deployed FL systems, they are not considered in this study, which assumes synchronous schemes throughout.

2.3 Federated Object Detection

FOD combines the goal of OD with the distributed training paradigm of FL, where raw data remain on the participating nodes [21]. As a result, OD models can be trained collaboratively across multiple devices or organisations without centralising sensitive visual data, enabling privacy- and security-preserving applications [7]. While the underlying detection models are largely transferable to FL settings, FOD introduces additional system-level design considerations including aggregation strategies, topology selection, communication protocols, and robustness under non-IID data distributions. These considerations are examined in detail in Chapter 3.

Chapter 3

Related Work

Building on the background information provided, this chapter continues by critically assessing existing literature in the field of FOD through a systematic review. The aim is to derive concrete design requirements and configuration dimensions for the framework developed in this thesis. The chapter first outlines the review methodology and corpus construction before systematically analysing the works found in the field.

3.1 Methodology

A systematic literature review approach following the guidelines of [65] is adopted. A high-level abstraction of the screening and selection process with the resulting number of included works at each step is summarised in Figure 3.1.

The related work identified through the systematic review is complemented by seminal studies of the field and key papers discovered through citation backtracking, since this work is not limited to a literature review but at its core addresses the design of a prototypical DFOD system. Building on these findings, core implementation details from SoTA research is then considered for incorporation as configuration options in the design outline described in depth in Chapter 4.

This work performed an initial literature search using the SCOPUS and IEEE Xplore databases. The search queries are summarised in Table 3.1. Details such as spelling differences are omitted here.

Following the identification stage, records were retrieved from both the SCOPUS and IEEE Xplore databases, including additional results from advanced query refinements. After removing duplicates, titles and abstracts were screened to exclude irrelevant studies. The inclusion and exclusion criteria highlighted in Table 3.2 were applied to ensure relevance. Full-text articles of the remaining studies were subsequently assessed for eligibility, leading to the exclusion of three papers that did not meet the inclusion criteria. The final set of studies was complemented by backwards citation chaining, ensuring that seminal contributions not captured in the original database queries were also considered.




Figure 3.1: Screening and selection process of the literature review following [65].

As a last refining step, the papers were assessed on their similarity. This multi-stage procedure resulted in the final corpus of 39 papers that forms the basis of the review.

The collection and categorisation of the distilled related work can be found in Table 3.3. It provides a meta overview outlining the themes along three core categories that were extracted in the review of the chosen works. *Learning Setup* distinguishes between the different overarching connectivity paradigms in FL. The *Problem Domain* groups the papers' core themes and foci, whereas the *Methodological Themes* aim to provide an overview of the core research with respect to FL as a whole. References through the backward citation chain are denoted in italics (e.g. *[31]*).

To identify trends in (DF)OD, relevant studies are categorised in Table 3.4 by *Detector Family*, *Datasets*, *Evaluation Metrics*, and *Aggregation/Topology*.

Table 3.1: Search queries in IEEE Xplore and Scopus.

Database	**Query**
IEEE Xplore	"All Metadata": Decentralised AND "All Metadata": Federated AND "All Metadata": Object Detection AND (Publication Year: 2023 OR 2024 OR 2025) AND (Language: English)
Scopus	TITLE-ABS-KEY("Federated Learning" AND "Object Detection" AND "Decentralised") AND PUBYEAR > 2022 AND PUBYEAR < 2026 AND (LIMIT-TO(LANGUAGE, "English"))

Table 3.2: Inclusion and exclusion criteria refining the related work corpus.

Criteria Type	**Description**
Inclusion	– Studies on (decentralised) federated learning – Explicit focus on object detection tasks – Articles or conference publications – Published in English between 2023 and 2025
Exclusion	– Studies unrelated to federated learning or object detection – Overly narrow, industry-specific focus – Outdated or non-applicable techniques – Duplicates or near duplicates (precedent to most recent)

In the following sections, this chapter delves into specifics of the reviewed works, synthesizing the reviewed literature with respect to recurring design choices in FL, DFL, and OD, highlighting seminal work, and showcasing core OD applications in FL and DFL for prominent FL domains.

3.2 Centralised Federated Learning

Centralised FL (simply FL) was proposed by [31] in 2016 as a learning paradigm leaving data distributed on mobile devices and learning a shared model using a centralised coordinating server. Beyond providing the motivation for such a system they also provide the foundation for *federated optimisation* via Federated Stochastic Variance Reduced Gradient *(FSVRG)*, leveraging earlier methods like Distributed Approximate Newton *(DANE)* as well as highlighting inherent and challenging properties of the field: "*massively distributed, non-IID, unbalanced, and sparse data*". [43] refined this proposal introducing *FedAvg* - a server-orchestrated FL methodology utilizing deep networks with iterative model averaging, leveraging Stochastic Gradient Descent *(SGD)*. *FedProx* [37] generalizes and re-parametrizes *FedAvg* with a proximal term to handle both statistical and systemic

Table 3.3: Meta-overview of related work.

	Sub-Domains	**References**
Learning Setup	Centralised FL	[17, 3, 70, 66, 44, 55, 12, 1, 10, 11], *[31, 37, 25, 19, 43, 42]*
	Decentralised FL (DFL)	[9, 33, 26, 36, 35, 4, 59], *[34, 63, 5, 19, 61, 57, 71, 6, 46, 22, 23, 69]*
	Semi-/Hierarchical FL	[2, 18, 68]
	Cross-Concern / Horizontal Surveys	[7], *[74]*
Problem Domain	Foundational / Methodological	[33, 70, 36, 12, 35, 18, 68, 11], *[31, 74, 34, 63, 5, 37, 25, 19, 71, 61, 57, 6, 46, 43, 22, 42, 23, 69]*
	Autonomous Driving / Vehicular	[9, 55, 1, 7, 4, 10]
	Surveillance / Security / IIoT	[2, 3, 26, 59]
	Healthcare / Medical	[17]
	Object Detection	[2, 9, 17, 3, 26, 66, 44, 12, 1, 35, 18, 4, 10, 11]
Methodological Themes	Data Privacy & Security	[9, 17, 3, 66, 55, 1, 35, 18, 7, 11, 59], *[74, 5, 71, 6]*
	Robustness & Generalisation	[2, 9, 26, 70, 36, 59], *[34, 63, 37, 25, 71, 61, 6, 46, 43, 22, 42, 23, 69]*
	Scalability & Resource Management	[33, 3, 12, 7, 68, 4, 10], *[31, 37, 19, 71, 61, 57, 6, 43, 22, 42]*
	Model Performance & Optimisation	[33], *[31, 19, 57, 46]*

heterogeneity, i.e., non-IID data as well as device dissimilarity, allowing for partial work of certain nodes. In highly heterogenous and non-controlled settings, that is with resource constraints, *FedProx* displays a significantly higher stability.

Since these foundational works were published, a large number of specialized FL papers have refined the methodologies. The remainder of this paragraph presents few cherry-picked seminal studies. [25] leverage *attentive message passing* and introduce *federated attentive message passing (FedAMP)* such that similar clients, defined via a similarity proxy using a client's model parameters, are encouraged to collaborate more. This discriminative approach is also coined as *personalized FL* as clients no longer blindly incorporate any shared knowledge. The aspect of privacy preservation is a core motivator for FL in general and is mentioned throughout the entire corpus. Notably, [74] dig into this topic on a metalevel while [66] propose a framework for object detection with differential privacy. Besides privacy, the robustness of FL system has been addressed in depth. FL has proven to aid in model robustness [26] compared to traditional model baselines, as

Category	Item	**Count** (papers)
Detector Families	YOLO family (v5/v7/v11 grouped)	6/14
	Faster R-CNN	6/14
	Transformer-based 3D (V2X-ViT)	1/14
	(PointNet classifier)	1/14
Datasets	PASCAL VOC	8/14
	MS COCO	6/14
	Autonomous driving (KITTI, V2X-Set, V2X-Fed, nuScenes)	6/14
	INRIA Person	3/14
	Helmet	1/14
Evaluation Metrics	mAP (and variants)	9/14
	Accuracy-based (classification/detection)	3/14
	APsrc (targeted-class robustness)	1/14
	AP70 (3D)	1/14
Aggregation / Topology	FedAvg and DFedAvg	8/14
	Hierarchical FL	2/14
	Split learning (edge–cloud)	1/14

Table 3.4: Federated object detection landscape summary across federated learning and decentralised federated learning papers ($n = 14$).

collaboration and knowledge sharing across distributed nodes inherently improves generalisation and builds resilience to overfitting. [70] developed a framework robust against poisoning attacks (model poisoning and data poisoning) using reputation-aware robust aggregation leveraging adversary detection via biased parameter identification and an accuracy estimate.

Related semi-hierarchical architectures have also emerged in recent times, such as edge-cloud designs like *MistNet* [18], which partitions YOLOv5, performs a one shot upload of intermediate features to the cloud, while maintaining a fixed pre-trained edge extractor. In essence it retains the data locality of FL, yet centralizes the training again rather than using some form of federated aggregation.

Beyond the methodological work, [19] present the *FedML* research library supporting on-device, distributed, and single machine FL with a wide range of customization options, including optimiser, model and dataset selection. More concrete implementation of centralised FL include amongst others [12] focussed on OD, proposing client selection for heterogeneous, non-IID datasets based on metadata aware selection such as location to speed-up convergence, reduce training time and improve scalability.

Centralised FL has been applied to diverse domains since; Section 3.4 reviews a subset.

3.3 Decentralised Federated Learning

Early work on DFL is closely related to optimisation over time-varying graphs [46] and is a core theoretical building block for DFL with respect to consensus finding and optimisation. [63] extend this idea to what they describe as peer-to-peer networks with per-

sonalized models under an aligned objective assumption. Together with [34] that present a first server-less-aggregation variant of Bayesian-style belief-update systems via one-hop neighbour aggregation, these studies form the essential foundations for DFL.

Based on these works, various core decentralised optimisers have emerged. [22] extend the centralised *FedAvg* aggregation method to a decentralised variant *DFedAvg* primarily through a communication-efficient training framework for linear models coined *CoLa* (Communication-Efficient Decentralised Federated Learning). Transferring advances from general centralised learning, [57] include a momentum component into the learning and variations thereof for both a convergence speed-up and reduced communication cost. These methods in their plain versions assume a node configurational homogeneity (e.g. IID-data, parameter configuration) and blindly aggregate knowledge disregarding potential disruptive aggregation effects. While early works such as [37] do pick up these issues, [61] present a potential specialized aggregation method under such heterogeneous configuration scenarios. Rather than aggregating knowledge plainly, updates are scaled inversely proportional to the L_2-distance to the neighbourhood average model. The underlying assumption is that proximity to the neighbourhood average, i.e., the convergence target, indicates a model's alignment with a collective trend thus reducing the risk of encountering a destabilizing updates.

Beyond optimisation and aggregation techniques, the personalization and privacy preservation potential of DFL has been assessed in-depth. Early works such as [34] already highlight this upside. [5] for that matter add differential privacy and formalize the utility-privacy trade-off in peer-to-peer settings, showing that, beyond maintaining convergence guarantees, privacy-aware distributed models outperform local-only variants. [42] address the personalization aspect directly under the important premise that a global model, may perform arbitrarily bad for any individual client once relaxing the IID constraint. [42] propose Federated Expectation Maximization *(FedEM)*, which allows clients to jointly learn shared component models together with personalized mixture weights - both in CFL and DFL. *FedEM* builds on Expectation Maximization, a methodology commonly used to solve non-convex problems. Lifting this comparably restrictive homogeneity constraint is a crucial step towards widespread applicability of DFL, and has specifically interesting downstream implications for IoT devices and ML (see. Section 3.4).

In contrast to the centralised FL case, where a server can apply a single robust aggregation rule, DFL must achieve robustness through local neighbour exchanges only. This makes the task of resiliency fundamentally harder. Recent work focuses on Byzantine-robust decentralised training rules bounding the influence of updates and limiting outlier update magnitudes to stabilise training [23, 69]. Building on this notion of robustness, domain specific robustness approaches have been proposed. [59] developed *MSecureChain*, a blockchain-backed decentralised collaborative Intrusion Detection System, built on a device-edge-cloud-application architecture to mitigate poisoning attacks through decentralised coordination.

Leveraging these foundational works, many frameworks have been developed making DFL widely applicable. These decentralised methods form the basis for applying FL in tasks such as OD, which we discuss next.

3.4 Object Detection in Federated Learning

In FL and DFL, foundational work is primarily related to the systemic level, e.g., aggregation/topology, communication, robustness/security, privacy and heterogeneity, yet not on a model-architectural level. Table 3.4 highlights this fact, as the extracted detector families, datasets, and evaluation metrics are non-FL specific but originate in plain single-machine ML. By extension, image analysis and the associated models are learning-paradigm-transferable, excluding FL-aware tweaks, such as partial-layer exchange (e.g., [42, 4]) or specific weight update paradigms (e.g., [10]) that alter sub-routines. Against this background, the following paragraph summarizes studies that have paved the way for OD in DFL and highlights core applications.

A common starting point for OD is image classification. [4] and [36] are among the pioneering works that motivate such applications in DFL. [36] outlines a methodology for image classification to create a collaborator focussed, personalized model in even very sparse network topologies for both IID and non-IID data. [4] demonstrate convergence and accuracy retention under partial-layer parameter exchange in the autonomous driving setting for non-IID data that translates naturally to OD backbones. As a federated learning point of reference for OD, [1] train YOLOv8 with *FedAvg* for autonomous driving demonstrating a viable accuracy-privacy trade-off for real time OD. For OD in DFL, [35] propose DP-DeceFL with BEV-FePNet and differential privacy, *i.e.*, a BEV-style 3D detector in a multi-modal setting for autonomous-driving. This is specifically interesting when targeting small and distant objects and showcases the applicability of DFL OD in security critical applications with high data-privacy and compliance requirements.

In general, AV has received significant attention. [55] present a vehicular safety FL framework using YOLO. [10] introduce parameter-efficient adapters with delayed communication for 3D cooperative perception in AV significantly reducing bandwidth while preserving full-model accuracy. [7] have synthesized essential advances in AV FL and highlight core limitations that persist regardless of the attention the field has received, which include non-IID nature of the data, latency and privacy. Beyond AVs, [17] present a caries detection system in a centralised manner using YOLO highlighting the potential specifically for the medical domain due to privacy and heterogeneity considerations. [3] leverage remote sensing for airport security applications and [44] implement a maize disease management monitoring system, highlighting broader applicability across many domains.

From a systemic-view the bulk of the analysed work adopts off-the-shelf detectors with minor FL-related tweaks in sub-routines. A standard that is also transferable to the widely use evaluation metrics. Configurations regarding aggregation, topology, and communication, are at the core of the parametrization of FL-implementations and offer a wide range of exploration opportunities. Encompassed therein are robustness aspects including heterogeneity, privacy, personalization, and security. Building on these observations the work at hand presents a decentralised federated learning framework supporting object detection for developing, benchmarking, and testing a wide range of DFOD configurations. Henceforth, this work will first motivate certain design choices building on Chapters 2 and 3, and then conduct a series of experiments showcasing the applicability and flexibility of the framework.

Chapter 4

Design and Implementation

The following chapter will dive into the architectural choices and intricacies of the developed system. Since this work builds on the platform *FLyra*, some elements were used as-is or extended using the existing infrastructure, while others were developed from scratch. For completeness, the following shows the core elements used in the experimental part of this work, and attribution is clearly stated where the work is derivative. Table 4.1 summarises the core design decisions of this work. The remainder of this chapter motivates each choice and describes how they are implemented in *FLyra*.

Table 4.1: Experimental setup summary.

Item	**Setting**	**Section**
Model	YOLOv5 [28]	4.3.1
Dataset	MS COCO [40]	4.3.2
Aggregation	Neighbour averaging (FedAvg)	4.3.3
Primary metric	COCO mAP@0.5:0.95	4.3.4
Auxiliary metric	YOLOv5 composite loss (box/obj/cls)	4.3.4

4.1 *FLyra* Architecture: An Overview

FLyra is a DFL platform facilitating research-focused scenario analyses within image classification and as a result of this work also object detection. The methodology follows an event-driven sequence with a coordinating service acting as an overarching handler allowing the decentralised scenario simulation via a comprehensive configuration setup, round orchestration, given n participating nodes.

The coordinator implements a centralised orchestration mechanism for managing DFL scenarios. It provides a web-based interface that enables users to configure and launch experiments by specifying parameters such as the number of participating nodes, network topology, aggregation algorithms, datasets, and potential adversarial attack strategies. Upon initialisation, the coordinator manages participant registration through a join

mechanism, assigning unique identifiers and network ports to each node while distributing scenario-specific configuration data. During execution, the coordinator maintains real-time monitoring capabilities, collecting status updates, logs, and training metrics from participants to provide live visualisation of the learning process. It integrates with the external monitoring tool Weights & Biases (WandB), thereby enhancing experiment tracking and reproducibility.

The participants connect to the coordinating service and progress through predefined workflow states, including node initialisation, training execution, gossip-based communication, and aggregation phases. Each participant retains its own local model and dataset, performs training on local data when instructed, and contributes to federated aggregation using algorithms such as *FedAvg*. The framework accommodates both benign and adversarial behaviour by enabling configurable attack implementations, including label-flipping and model-update manipulation strategies. Communication between participants occurs through gossip protocols for peer-to-peer model sharing and distributed coordination mechanisms that synchronise the federated learning workflow across all nodes. Furthermore, the system is designed to be deployment-agnostic, supporting execution via integrated development environments, command-line interfaces, and dockerised orchestration, while ensuring synchronised execution across all participants regardless of deployment configuration. Algorithm 1 outlines the control flow from the participant's view as in the fundamental *FLyra* implementation.

Algorithm 1 *FLyra* high-level control flow (participant-side, coordinator-driven).

Coordinator C configures scenario S and starts orchestration loop
for all Participant p_i **do**
    p_i joins S, receives config, initializes local state
end for
for $r = 0$ **to** $R - 1$ **do**
    C emits `START_TRAINING`(r)
    for all p_i **in parallel do**
        if $r = 0$ **then**
            Build partitioned dataset views $\{ds_i^{\text{train}}, ds_i^{\text{val}}, ds_i^{\text{test}}\}$
            Instantiate model m_i from registry; bind task strategy
        end if
        Configure logging/callbacks (e.g., WandB, checkpoints, eval hooks)
        Train m_i locally for E epochs; evaluate
        Gossip update (params + metadata) to neighbours
        Apply attack hooks (data / update manipulation) if enabled
    end for
    C emits `START_AGGREGATION`(r)
    for all p_i **in parallel do**
        Collect updates for round r (local + neighbours)
        Aggregate updates using selected method
        Load aggregated parameters into m_i; evaluate; report status
    end for
end for

4.2 *FLyra*: Generic Extensions

This work extends *FLyra* beyond the OD components to ease the experimentation workflow. The core changes include elements concerning *coordinator UX and UI*, *model checkpoints*, *MPS compatibility* and *garbage collection*.

Coordinator UX and UI. The coordinator interface was refined to improve UX. Reporting and statistics displays were adapted to consider the distinction between OD and classification runs, while the configuration panels were reworked for smoother use (e.g., collapsible sections and simplified defaults). A Minor UI polish (spacing rules and colour adjustments) improves readability and display clarity.

Model Checkpoints. Model checkpoint logic was fundamentally overhauled for reliable model saving. Parametrisation includes the selection of an applicable metric to be monitored, configurable selection logic (min/max), and best-only save mode for saving only the best checkpoint in terms of the monitored metric. This makes experiment comparison and especially recovery straightforward without any manual bookkeeping.

MPS Compatibility. For development and local testing, Metal Performance Shaders (MPS) support was added to enable GPU acceleration on Apple devices. This improves iteration speed in development without reliance on CUDA-specific setups.

Garbage Collection. A memory leak in the *FLyra* framework that led to excessive RAM consumption during training runs was identified. To mitigate this, a proactive garbage collection strategy that manually clears unused parameters during training was implemented.

Visualisation Pipeline. To facilitate visual comparison of experiments, a lightweight visualisation pipeline was engineered. It is based on two classes: `ClassMAPPlotter` and `ProjectComparisonPlotter`. `ClassMAPPlotter` targets individual experiments, allowing import of selected metrics from Weights & Biases and providing visualisations of metric progression, class mappings across federated nodes, and Jensen–Shannon Divergence. In contrast, `ProjectComparisonPlotter` supports cross-project analysis by aggregating runs and enabling metric comparisons across experiments.

Analytics. To support the analysis of different scenarios, a set of dedicated analytics scripts was developed. These scripts are tightly coupled to the selected experimental setup, evaluation protocol, and benchmark choice, and thus are not generally applicable. For this reason, the analytics component is kept fully separate from the core implementation of *FLyra*.

4.3 *FLyra*: Object Detection

In the context of object detection, several design choices were made to adapt the federated learning framework to this domain.

4.3.1 Model

For model selection, the YOLO family of one-stage detectors was selected due to its widespread adoption in academic settings following the findings in Table 3.4. The alternative two-stage detector family with the prominent Faster R-CNN implementation was considered as well, yet discarded due to its computational more intensive implementation. YOLO was first introduced by [51]. Conceptually, it is a "single convolutional network that simultaneously predicts multiple bounding boxes and class probabilities for those boxes" [51]. In practice, this translates to partitioning the input image into a fixed grid of C cells. Each cell predicts the parameters of B bounding boxes (c_x, c_y, w, h) denoting centre coordinates and dimensions, an objectness score o for each box, and a probability distribution $p(y \mid o)$ over the predefined target classes Y, thereby unifying localisation and classification.

Since its inception, YOLO has undergone numerous iterations [49, 50, 67]. Key advancements include the adoption of anchor boxes and multi-scale training in YOLOv2 [49], the replacement of the Darknet-19 backbone with the deeper residual Darknet-53 (both CNNs for feature extraction) in YOLOv3 [50], and the release of YOLOv5 as an open-source PyTorch implementation that emphasises modularity and training-time improvements [28]. Finally, YOLOv7 [67] introduces training-time optimisation strategies (e.g., data augmentation and loss adaptations) that improve training while keeping inference unchanged. Ultralytics has continued the YOLO line with successive releases up to YOLOv26 [60].

While newer variants achieve stronger absolute performance, the present work prioritizes an open-source, well-documented, and reproducible implementation that integrates cleanly with the PyTorch ecosystem. Further, the evaluation in this work emphasises relative performance changes between different scenarios (e.g., centralised vs four nodes decentralised) rather than optimising an absolute performance benchmark. Thus, the paper at hand uses the comparatively lightweight YOLOv5 as the backbone for all subsequent experiments. Its modular design and native compatibility with the PyTorch ecosystem facilitate reliable and straightforward integration in the *FLyra* framework.

4.3.2 Dataset

Analogous to the model choice, in dataset selection the focus was placed on alignment with common practices in DFOD. Table 3.4 shows that prior work relies heavily on either *PASCAL VOC* or *MS COCO*. The latter is the most suitable for this work, as it is comprised of significantly more images and contains a larger set of object classes than PASCAL VOC (see Table 4.2). These characteristics together with the more challenging

scenes (cluttered and overlapping objects) make COCO a more demanding benchmark. While not directly relevant to the experiments conducted here, COCO's size and class diversity provide greater flexibility for follow-up experiments, including heterogeneous and non-IID partitioning setups, which keeps the here presented findings comparable with such downstream work.

Table 4.2: Overview of commonly used object-detection benchmarks in decentralised federated object detection.

Dataset	Year	#Classes	Images (labeled)	Instances (labeled)
PASCAL VOC [14]	2012	20	11,540	27,450
MS COCO [40]	2017	80	123,287	896,782

COCO defines 91 categories but the detection benchmark uses 80, and additionally provides 40,670 *test* images without public annotations (total 163,957 images) [40]. VOC instance count refers to annotated objects in VOC2012 [14]; COCO instance count refers to train+val bounding-box annotations [40].

At the same time, however, this choice implies that the work conducted here draws conclusions applicable to general performance environments. For narrower application domains, this choice of dataset may not be applicable and domain specific datasets are required for better alignment.

Data Distribution and IID Assumption

A primary concern in the design of the FL system is whether the Independent and Identically Distributed (IID) assumption holds across decentralised nodes. Initial inspection of the COCO dataset reveals substantial class imbalance; as shown in Figure 4.1, the frequency of object categories varies by several orders of magnitude. However, this global imbalance does not violate the IID assumption. Rather, the critical factor is whether the relative distribution at each node matches the global dataset distribution.




Figure 4.1: Data distribution.




Figure 4.2: Relative class occurrence.

To assess this, the dataset was randomly partitioned across four nodes. As illustrated in Figure 4.2, each node possesses approximately 25% of the global occurrences for every class. This uniform distribution suggests that label skew between nodes is negligible, supporting the validity of the IID assumption across the decentralised network.

To quantify this observation, the pairwise Jensen–Shannon Divergence (JSD) between the empirical label distributions of each node was computed. JSD is a symmetric and bounded measure of distributional similarity derived from the Kullback–Leibler divergence, with lower values indicating greater similarity [39].

Table 4.3: Pairwise Jensen-Shannon divergence (JSD) matrix for 4-node data distribution.

Node ID	**Node 0**	**Node 1**	**Node 2**	**Node 3**
Node 0	0.000000	0.000660	0.000443	0.000614
Node 1	0.000660	0.000000	0.000590	0.000628
Node 2	0.000443	0.000590	0.000000	0.000664
Node 3	0.000614	0.000628	0.000664	0.000000

As shown in Table 4.3, the mean pairwise JSD is 0.0005998, indicating that the variance between nodes is negligible. This mathematical verification confirms that the partitioned dataset can be considered IID for the purposes of this study, ensuring that observed performance metrics are not skewed by severe statistical heterogeneity between nodes.

4.3.3 Aggregation

Regarding aggregation, this work adopts *FedAvg* [57] as the default strategy for combining client updates, i.e., model parameter sharing. *FedAvg* is the most widely used baseline in FL due to its conceptually simple implementation for parameter aggregation and its little computational impact. This aligns it well with the core objective of this study to evaluate this prototypical DFOD setup. It is topology, communication-overhead, and client-heterogeneity agnostic, separating system- and model-dependent effects. As a result, the observed performance differences across scenarios can be clearly attributed to the effects of the experimental parametrisation, rather than artefacts of more specialised aggregation methods. Accordingly, *FedAvg* is applied in each communication round by aggregating the locally updated model parameters.

With K as the set of clients in round t, and local dataset sizes n_k and $N = \sum_{k \in K} n_k$, each client starts from its current model $w^{(t)}$, performs local training, and returns updated parameters $w_k^{(t+1)}$. The aggregated model is then simply the weighted average

$$w^{(t+1)} = \sum_{k \in K} \frac{n_k}{N} w_k^{(t+1)}.$$

In the decentralised setting, aggregation is performed via neighbour-to-neighbour averaging, i.e., over the neighbourhood of each participating node. Let $\mathcal{N}_i$ be the neighbourhood of node i (including itself) and let a_{ij} denote the mixing weights (with $a_{ij} = 0$ if $j \notin \mathcal{N}_i$

and $\sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}_i} a_{ij} = 1$). After local training, node i updates its model by averaging the received neighbour models:

$$w_i^{(t+1)} = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}_i} a_{ij} \, w_j^{(t+1)}.$$

In its base form this paper uses uniform weights, $a_{ij} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{N}_i|}$, simplifying aggregation to the neighbourhood mean

$$w_i^{(t+1)} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{N}_i|} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}_i} w_j^{(t+1)}.$$

4.3.4 Evaluation Metrics

Mean Average Precision

Object detection research has introduced various evaluation criteria to assess model performance [48]. This work employs the Mean Average Precision *(mAP)* metric, which is widely regarded as the standard performance measure in object detection [48]. While mAP was originally introduced in the context of information retrieval in the 1990s [54], it became firmly established in computer vision through the PASCAL VOC challenge [14].

The COCO benchmark [40] introduced a more rigorous evaluation protocol that computes mAP over multiple Intersection-over-Union *(IoU)* thresholds, ranging from 0.5 to 0.95 in increments of 0.05. The Intersection-over-Union metric quantifies the spatial overlap between a predicted bounding box B_{pred} and ground-truth bounding box B_{gt}:

$$\text{IoU}(B_{\text{pred}}, B_{\text{gt}}) = \frac{|B_{\text{pred}} \cap B_{\text{gt}}|}{|B_{\text{pred}} \cup B_{\text{gt}}|}$$

The COCO mAP metric, commonly referred to as mAP@0.5:0.95, averages the Average Precision *(AP)* across all classes $\mathcal{C}$ and IoU thresholds:

$$\text{mAP}_{0.5:0.95} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{C}|} \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \text{AP}(c, \text{IoU}_t)$$

where $T = 10$ represents the number of IoU thresholds from 0.5 to 0.95. This metric jointly assesses both the correctness of predicted class labels and the spatial alignment of bounding boxes with ground-truth annotations. Compared to a single IoU threshold of 0.5, the COCO protocol provides a more comprehensive and challenging assessment of detector performance, making it well-suited for evaluating modern architectures such as YOLO. Notably, COCO mAP is computed by averaging AP across classes, which reduces the dominance of frequent classes and thus mitigates the impact of class imbalance on the aggregate score. Nevertheless, in settings with strongly skewed label distributions or non-IID partitions, per-class AP can vary substantially. In this work, experiments primarily consider IID data splits, for which COCO mAP provides a robust summary metric.

For a detailed overview of all implemented evaluation metrics, see Appendix A.

Loss

The loss for OD in YOLOv5 is a weighted composite of three distinct loss components, each addressing a specific aspect of the detection task. The total loss $\mathcal{L}_{\text{total}}$ is computed as:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{total}} = \lambda_{\text{box}} \cdot \mathcal{L}_{\text{box}} + \lambda_{\text{obj}} \cdot \mathcal{L}_{\text{obj}} + \lambda_{\text{cls}} \cdot \mathcal{L}_{\text{cls}}$$

where λ_{box}, λ_{obj}, and λ_{cls} are hyperparameter weights that balance the contribution of each component [28].

The **bounding box regression loss** $\mathcal{L}_{\text{box}}$ measures the localisation accuracy using Intersection over Union (IoU), which accounts for overlap, distance, and aspect ratio between predicted and ground-truth boxes. Specifically, it is computed as $\mathcal{L}_{\text{box}} = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}(1 - \text{IoU}(b_i^{\text{pred}}, b_i^{\text{gt}}))$, where N is the number of positive anchor-target pairs.

The **objectness loss** $\mathcal{L}_{\text{obj}}$ employs binary cross-entropy (BCE) to predict whether each anchor contains an object, computed across all grid cells and anchor boxes at multiple detection scales.

The **classification loss** $\mathcal{L}_{\text{cls}}$ is a multi-class BCE loss applied only to positive anchors, measuring the accuracy of class predictions for detected objects.

This composite loss function enables the model to simultaneously optimise for accurate object localisation, confident objectness predictions, and correct class assignments, which are all essential for effective object detection performance.

4.3.5 Reporting

The project leverages comprehensive experiment tracking through the WandB platform previously implemented in *FLyra*. A single persistent WandB run is maintained across the entire federated learning scenario, logging training configuration parameters such as the batch size and the learning rate. This work extends this setup with OD-specific metrics, outlined in detail in Section 4.3.4.

The logging system employs different metric namespaces with different point cuts. For each of the following point cuts, new metrics can easily be added. In the setup used here, the following point cuts were employed: Training metrics are logged sparsely via `on_batch_end` and indexed by a global step counter, while `on_epoch_end` captures per-epoch training summaries. Evaluation results are logged through `on_eval_end` and indexed by federated learning round, automatically tracking metrics at two phases within each communication round: after local training (`AFTER_TRAINING`) and after aggregation (`AFTER_AGGREGATION`). The `on_train_start` hook initialises the experiment tracking session and logs dataset metadata.


4.3.6 Object Watermarking

A further extension was created with respect to robustness evaluation of FOD. In particular, a watermarking configuration extends the scenario parametrisation and enables controlled data poisoning via a simple patch trigger. Concretely, an X-shaped watermark with a size of $\frac{1}{3}$ of the corresponding bounding box is inserted into selected object instances of poisoned training samples. The watermark is applied inside the bounding box region, thereby preserving the original label while introducing a consistent visual trigger. Direct configuration allows selection of the poisoned class, the trigger opacity, and the number of affected nodes. More sophisticated trigger variants can be added modularly in code.

Figure 4.3 shows the watermark trigger (Figure 4.3a) and an exemplary application to a training instance with bounding boxes in red (Figure 4.3b).



(a) Watermark trigger.



(b) Watermark applied.

Figure 4.3: Watermark trigger (left) and an example of the trigger applied to all objects in a training instance with bounding boxes in red (right).

Chapter 5

Preliminary Experiments

To identify an effective configuration for the federated environment, preliminary experiments were conducted to evaluate the trade-offs between initialisation strategy (pretrained vs. training from scratch), selective layer freezing, and targeted hyperparameter optimisation. The outcomes of this exploration inform the final configuration adopted for the core experiments presented in Chapter 6.

Unless stated otherwise, all experiments were conducted using the full COCO dataset with a base configuration of 10 (15 for preliminary training continuation testing) training rounds. 10 was selected through trial and error as sufficiently large to observe clear early-stage optimisation behaviour before transitioning into an asymptotic convergence regime. Simulations were executed on a university server equipped with an NVIDIA T4 GPU, with a single-node run requiring approximately 15 hours. Mean Average Precision (mAP) and cross-entropy loss were monitored across both training and test sets to assess generalisation and convergence stability. Each experiment is denoted with an experiment identifier *(EID)*, referenced throughout the text.

5.1 Centralised Models

This section first evaluates whether pretrained YOLOv5 weights provide a suitable starting point for later experiments, or whether training from scratch offers higher potential to investigate different configuration on DFOD performance. This question arises since the provided model weights of YOLOv5 are the general purpose *best* performing parameters as trained by Ultralytics. Accordingly, the *goal is not to outperform the Ultralytics reference weights through additional MS COCO fine-tuning, but to use a controlled baseline to analyse relative performance changes across decentralised configurations and experimental parameters.* Further, this impacts the hyperparameter tuning which is not optimized but rather chosen to support a stable baseline configuration.

Pretrained Model (EID 0.1)

The first experiment evaluated a fully pretrained YOLOv5 model with all layers enabled for fine-tuning. While the training mAP increased rapidly, exceeding 50%, the test mAP decreased substantially, indicating severe overfitting.




Figure 5.1: mAP: pretrained model overfitting (EID 0.1).




Figure 5.2: Loss: pretrained model divergence (EID 0.1).

As illustrated in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, the test mAP declined sharply after the initial rounds while the test loss increased significantly. This divergence suggests that the model, having been pretrained on COCO, memorised specific noise patterns within the training partition rather than refining generalisable features.

The divergence between training and test loss curves further confirms overfitting. The training loss exhibits a consistent decline while the test loss trends upward, indicating a failure to generalise to unseen data.

Backbone Freezing and Hyperparameter Tuning (EIDs 0.2 and 0.3)

To mitigate the overfitting observed in EID 0.1, the backbone architecture was frozen in EID 0.2, leaving only the final detection head trainable. The hypothesis was that restricting the parameter space would force the model to utilise robust, pretrained features. However, this approach led to severe underfitting; the model achieved only marginal performance improvements, effectively failing to learn from the data distribution.

EID 0.3 attempted to address this issue by increasing the learning rate from 5×10^{-5} to 10^{-3} while maintaining the frozen backbone configuration. This modification did not yield improvements. Instead, it introduced training instability and slight degradation in test mAP, confirming that a frozen backbone lacked the necessary representational capacity for this task.

As shown in Figures 5.3 and 5.4, the corresponding mAP and loss trajectories remain largely stagnant, indicating a lack of convergence and an inability to extract meaningful features from the training data.




Figure 5.3: mAP with frozen backbone (EIDs 0.2 and 0.3).




Figure 5.4: Loss with frozen backbone (EIDs 0.2 and 0.3).

Training from Scratch (EID 0.4)

Given the limitations of pretrained weights observed in EIDs 0.1 to 0.3, EID 0.4 evaluated a model with random initialisation (training from scratch). To allow for sufficient convergence, the training duration was extended to 15 rounds.

As expected, the model began with 0% mAP but demonstrated a consistent and stable learning trajectory. It achieved a training mAP of 20.81% and a test mAP of 11.2%. Crucially, both training and test loss decreased synchronously, as shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6. This behaviour indicates robust generalisation, providing a more reliable foundation for evaluating decentralised aggregation than the pretrained alternatives.




Figure 5.5: mAP with single node; random initialization (EID 0.4).




Figure 5.6: Loss with single node; random initialization (EID 0.4).

5.2 Distributed Training and Scalability

To validate that these observations also appear in distributed environments, EIDs 0.5 and 0.6 evaluate distributed setups with two nodes using *FedAvg* aggregation.

Pretrained Distributed with Two Nodes (EID 0.5)

The pretrained configuration continued to exhibit severe overfitting in the distributed setting, with the global model's performance peaking early and then declining as local nodes specialised too heavily on their respective data shards. This behaviour is illustrated in Figures 5.7 and 5.8.




Figure 5.7: mAP with two nodes; pretrained network (EID 0.5).




Figure 5.8: Loss with two nodes; pretrained network (EID 0.5).

Training from Scratch, Distributed (EID 0.6)

The training-from-scratch configuration mirrored the stability observed in EID 0.4. Both nodes progressed at similar rates, reaching an aggregated test mAP of approximately 8%. The consistent decrease in loss across both nodes, shown in Figures 5.9 and 5.10, suggests that this configuration scales effectively within a federated framework.

Following random initialisation, the training mAP demonstrates a steady ascent, reaching approximately 12%. The test mAP closely mirrors this trend, climbing to approximately 8%. The narrow gap between training and test metrics indicates that the model successfully generalises features without the severe divergence typically associated with overfitting.

Figure 5.10 depicts the training and test loss across both participating nodes. The curves demonstrate a high degree of synchronisation, with both training and test losses decreasing monotonically as training progresses.

Figures 5.11 and 5.12 reveal a significant finding regarding the impact of aggregation. The aggregated model consistently outperforms individual local nodes on the test set




Figure 5.9: mAP with two nodes; random initialization (EID 0.6).




Figure 5.10: Loss with two nodes; random initialization (EID 0.6).

throughout almost all training rounds, suggesting that the aggregation process mitigates overfitting and improves generalisation capacity.




Figure 5.11: mAP: aggregated vs local models (EID 0.6).




Figure 5.12: Loss: aggregated vs local models (EID 0.6).

5.3 Summary and Selection of Baseline

The results of the preliminary experiments are summarized in Table 5.1.

Figure 5.13 provides a comparative visualisation of the test mAP across all preliminary experimental configurations. Pretrained model configurations (EIDs 0.1, 0.2, and 0.5) fail to exhibit favourable convergence properties; these configurations show minimal performance improvements over the training duration, suffering from either severe overfitting or stagnant learning.

In contrast, EIDs 0.4 and 0.6 (training from scratch, represented by green and violet trajectories) exhibit consistent increases in test mAP across successive rounds. These

Table 5.1: Summary of preliminary configuration experiments (EIDs 0.1–0.6).

EID	Base	Frozen Layers	Nodes	Test mAP	Loss Trend	Outcome
0.1	Pretrained	None	1	28.0%	Divergent	Overfitting
0.2	Pretrained	Backbone	1	—	Flat	Underfitting
0.3	Pretrained	Backbone $LR\uparrow$	1	—	Unstable	Underfitting
0.4	**Scratch**	**None**	**1**	**11.2%**	**Convergent**	**Baseline**
0.5	Pretrained	None	2	30.2%	Divergent	Overfitting
0.6	**Scratch**	**None**	**2**	**9.26%**	**Convergent**	**Baseline**

configurations display the stability and generalisation capabilities required to effectively evaluate the impact of experimental variables and topological configurations in subsequent experiments.

Similarly, analysis of the test loss progression (Figure 5.14) reveals that only EIDs 0.4 and 0.6 achieve monotonic loss reduction, whereas alternative configurations show negligible improvement or divergent trends.




Figure 5.13: Test mAP across experiments (EIDs 0.1–0.6).




Figure 5.14: Test loss across experiments (EIDs 0.1–0.6).

Consequently, **EID 0.4 was selected as the single-node foundation and EID 0.6 as the base for federated experiments**. By training from scratch with a learning rate of 5×10^{-5} the observed performance metrics accurately reflect the influence of topology and synchronisation strategies rather than artefacts of pretrained initialisation. This outcome aligns with a priori expectation that the Ultralytics pretrained YOLOv5 weights, already optimised for MS COCO, offer limited headroom for further improvement under a comparatively small fine-tuning setup and therefore provide only limited sensitivity for a relative comparison of different federation scenarios. These baselines allow this thesis to go forward and delve into different configurations in federated settings and analyse/isolate different influencing factors.

Chapter 6

Evaluation

This chapter evaluates the built system from a few different perspectives: (I) a general benign configuration creating various baselines for different settings, (II) attack robustness, and (III) influence from a topological perspective. With these results at hand, this part demonstrates the variability and adaptability of the DFOD framework.

6.1 Experimental Setup and Overview

The experimental setup follows the baseline configuration deemed optimal in Chapter 5. Again, due to computational limitations and memory constraints experiments are not run to full convergence but with the following configuration applicable to *all* runs: **10 rounds - 1 Epoch per Round - Batch Size 8 - Learning Rate 5×10^{-5}**. In the below table, the experiments denoted with EID are summarized at a high level, including the number of nodes *N*, the learning rate *LR*, the topology used *Topology*, the aggregation method *Aggregation*, attacks applied *Attack*, and the fraction of data used *Data Fraction*. Each EID has an associated scenario ID that contains the full raw data. This mapping can be found in Appendix B.

Table 6.1: High-level experiment configuration overview.

EID	N	Topology	Aggregation	Attack	Data Fraction
1.1	1	-	-	-	1
1.2	1	-	-	-	$\frac{1}{4}$
1.3	4	FC	FedAvg	-	1
2.1	4	FC	FedAvg	class `person`, 1 node	1
2.2	4	FC	FedAvg	all classes, 1 node	1
2.3	1	-	-	class `person`	$\frac{1}{4}$
3.1	4	Ring	FedAvg	-	1
3.2	4	Star	FedAvg	-	1
3.3	4	Random	FedAvg	-	1

To compare centralised and federated training runs consistently, we track two families of metrics on a held-out test set: (I) task performance via Mean Average Precision (mAP), and (II) optimisation behaviour via the test loss. Since all experiments are organized in communication rounds, we report these metrics per round and distinguish between values measured `AFTER_TRAINING` *(AT)* and `AFTER_AGGREGATION` *(AA)*.

6.2 Main Findings

This section presents the results of all experiments conducted in this work. We begin with centralised baselines to establish upper and lower performance bounds, then evaluate federated learning with different network topologies, and finally assess the impact of backdoor attacks on system robustness. Table 6.2 provides a comprehensive overview of the final metrics across all experiments.

Table 6.2: High-level experiment result overview.

Group	EID	Node	mAP AT	mAP AA	Test Loss	Rel. mAP AA
Baselines	1.1	$node_0$	9.80%	9.80%	0.1424	100.0%
	1.2	$node_0$	2.85%	2.85%	0.1724	29.1%
	1.3	$node_0$	3.50%	5.46%	0.1534	55.7%
		$node_1$	3.90%	5.46%	0.1534	55.7%
		$node_2$	3.77%	5.46%	0.1534	55.7%
		$node_3$	3.84%	5.46%	0.1534	55.7%
Attacks	2.1	$node_0$	3.54%	4.94%	0.1565	50.4%
		$node_1$	3.26%	4.94%	0.1565	50.4%
		$node_2$	3.33%	4.94%	0.1565	50.4%
		$node_3$	3.20%	4.94%	0.1565	50.4%
	2.2	$node_0$	0.02%	3.38%	0.1630	34.5%
		$node_1$	3.24%	3.38%	0.1630	34.5%
		$node_2$	3.35%	3.38%	0.1630	34.5%
		$node_3$	2.85%	3.38%	0.1630	34.5%
	2.3	$node_0$	2.01%	2.01%	0.2228	20.51%
Topology	3.1	$node_0$	3.75%	4.87%	0.1545	49.7%
		$node_1$	3.16%	4.78%	0.1546	48.8%
		$node_2$	3.50%	4.74%	0.1546	48.4%
		$node_3$	3.65%	4.79%	0.1546	48.9%
	3.2	$node_0$	3.48%	4.26%	0.1580	43.5%
		$node_1$	3.38%	4.77%	0.1557	48.7%
		$node_2$	3.36%	4.31%	0.1578	44.0%
		$node_3$	3.31%	4.33%	0.1573	44.2%
	3.3	$node_0$	3.30%	4.89%	0.1546	49.9%
		$node_1$	3.67%	5.13%	0.1541	52.3%
		$node_2$	3.66%	3.66%	0.1615	37.3%
		$node_3$	3.87%	5.13%	0.1541	52.3%

6.2.1 Centralised Baseline

Centralised Baseline: Fixed LR (EID `1.1`)

This experiment serves as the main baseline for our work. A single node receives the complete dataset and is trained from scratch using a fixed learning rate.

Table 6.3: Results for EID 1.1.

Node	mAP AT	mAP AA	Test Loss
$node_0$	9.80%	9.80%	0.1424




Figure 6.1: mAP (EID 1.1).




Figure 6.2: Test loss (EID 1.1).

Figure 6.1 shows a steady and monotonic improvement in test mAP across rounds, rising from an initially very low value in the first round to 9.8% after 10 rounds. Most of the improvement happens in the early-to-mid rounds, after which the curve flattens, indicating diminishing returns as training progresses.

In addition, the curves `AFTER_TRAINING` and `AFTER_AGGREGATION` overlap throughout the experiment. This is expected in the centralised setting (no inter-node aggregation takes place) and therefore serves as a sanity check that the evaluation pipeline produces consistent results.

Figure 6.2 confirms the same convergence behaviour in terms of loss: the test loss decreases smoothly from approximately 0.18 in the first round to 0.1424 after 10 rounds (Table 6.2). The rate of improvement slows down after around rounds 6–7, which aligns with the plateauing behaviour observed in the mAP curve and suggests stable convergence without sudden instability.

Centralised Experiment: Data Fraction $\frac{1}{4}$ (EID `1.2`)

This experiment serves as a reduced-data centralised baseline: a single node is trained from scratch but receives only one quarter of the full dataset. Since the setup is not

Table 6.4: Results for EID 1.2.

Node	mAP AT	mAP AA	Test Loss
$node_0$	2.85%	2.85%	0.1724

federated, the `AFTER_TRAINING` and `AFTER_AGGREGATION` curves overlap by construction (the aggregation step does not change the model), providing an additional sanity check for the evaluation pipeline.

Figure 6.3 shows that the model follows the same qualitative learning dynamics as in the full-data centralised baseline (cf. Figure 6.1): test mAP increases steadily during the first rounds and then exhibits diminishing returns. Compared to the full-data run, the absolute performance is significantly lower, reaching 2.85% mAP by round 10 (Table 6.2). A notable detail is the short stagnation between rounds 6 and 7, before mAP increases again in the later rounds. In this specific run, the final mAP is approximately 29% of the full-data baseline (9.80%), suggesting a strongly data-limited regime under the chosen training budget. However, this should not be interpreted as a general linear scaling law; rather, it is an empirical observation for this configuration and time horizon.




Figure 6.3: mAP (EID 1.2).




Figure 6.4: Test loss (EID 1.2).

Figure 6.4 shows a smooth and stable decrease in test loss, dropping from approximately 0.22 in the first round to 0.1724 by round 10 (Table 6.2). The largest reduction occurs in the early rounds (1–3), after which the curve flattens and improvements become incremental, consistent with the plateauing behaviour observed in the mAP curve. Importantly, no instability or oscillations are visible, indicating that the optimisation remains well-behaved even when training on substantially less data; the primary effect is a lower achievable performance level within the same number of rounds.

6.2.2 Federated Baseline

Having established centralised baselines, we now examine federated learning configurations with clean data across different network topologies.

Federated Baseline: FC + FedAvg, N=4 (EID `1.3`)

Table 6.5: Results for EID 1.3.

Node	mAP AT	mAP AA	Test Loss
$node_0$	3.50%	5.46%	0.1534
$node_1$	3.90%	5.46%	0.1534
$node_2$	3.77%	5.46%	0.1534
$node_3$	3.84%	5.46%	0.1534

This experiment evaluates a fully connected federated setup with four nodes using FedAvg aggregation. As illustrated in Figure 6.5, the aggregated model (gray line) outperforms all individual nodes (blue, violet, pink, and green lines) after the third round. This observation suggests that the aggregation process mitigates overfitting on local training sets, enhancing the model's generalisation capacity compared to individual nodes.




Figure 6.5: mAP (EID 1.3).




Figure 6.6: Test loss (EID 1.3).

From Figure 6.5, two trends are visible. First, all models start close to 0% mAP in the first rounds and improve as training proceeds (training from scratch). Second, the aggregated model begins to separate from the individual nodes after roughly the third round and remains above them for the remainder of the experiment. By round 10, the aggregated model reaches 5.46% mAP (Table 6.2), while the best individual node reaches 3.90% mAP. This widening gap indicates that FedAvg is not merely averaging similar solutions, but produces a model that generalises better than any single locally-trained node.

Figure 6.6 provides a consistent picture in terms of test loss. The aggregated model exhibits a pronounced loss spike during the first two rounds (substantially higher than the local models), followed by a sharp drop around round 3. After that point, the aggregated model achieves the lowest test loss among all curves and continues to decrease smoothly until the end. Taken together with the mAP curves, this suggests that aggregation initially introduces instability (likely because the local models are still weak/immature in the first rounds), but once the local models reach a minimal quality threshold, FedAvg stabilises optimisation and improves generalisation compared to isolated local training.

6.2.3 Backdoor Attacks in Federated Learning

This section evaluates the system's resilience to data poisoning attacks, where a malicious participant injects backdoor triggers into training data. Importantly, this work does not focus on advanced robustness approaches such as [23] or [69], but considers only the inherent robustness gain of DFL setups. The attack method applied here follows a simple *patch trigger* methodology as outlined in Section 4.3.6.

Federated Attack: FC + FedAvg + Watermarking Class `person`, N=4 (EID `2.1`)

Table 6.6: Results for EID 2.1.

Node	mAP AT	mAP AA	Test Loss
$node_0$	3.54%	4.94%	0.1565
$node_1$	3.26%	4.94%	0.1565
$node_2$	3.33%	4.94%	0.1565
$node_3$	3.20%	4.94%	0.1565

This experiment evaluates the impact of a backdoor (data-poisoning) attack in a fully connected federated setup with FedAvg and $N = 4$ nodes. One node is malicious and applies a trigger to the training data for every object of class *person*. In this run, `node_2` (green) is the malicious participant and applied `65621` watermarks. The poisoned samples are then used for local training, and the resulting model updates are aggregated via FedAvg and distributed back to all nodes.




Figure 6.7: mAP (AT) (EID 2.1).




Figure 6.8: mAP (AA) (EID 2.1).

Figure 6.7 shows the *clean* test mAP after local training on each node. All four nodes follow a very similar trajectory, starting near 0% mAP and improving steadily after round 3. By round 10, all nodes converge to a comparable performance level (roughly 3.2–3.6% mAP), and the malicious node (`node_2`, green) does not stand out as an obvious outlier in terms of mAP. This indicates that, at least on the standard clean test evaluation, the poisoning does not dramatically degrade the apparent detection performance of the local model.

In `AFTER_AGGREGATION` (Figure 6.8), the curves collapse to a single trajectory (i.e., the node models become nearly identical after applying the aggregated update). The aggregated mAP increases considerably compared to the local models and reaches 4.94% by round 10 (Table 6.2). Hence, despite the presence of a malicious participant, FedAvg still yields a substantial improvement in test mAP over isolated local training in this configuration.




Figure 6.9: Test loss (AT) (EID 2.1).




Figure 6.10: Test loss (AA) (EID 2.1).

The loss curves provide additional nuance. In Figure 6.9, the test loss decreases smoothly for all nodes across rounds. However, the malicious node (`node_2`, green) consistently exhibits a higher test loss than the other three nodes throughout training (starting around 0.24 and ending around 0.18, while the others end closer to 0.16). This suggests that training on poisoned data can reduce clean generalisation for the malicious node itself, even if the corresponding mAP differences remain small.

In `AFTER_AGGREGATION` (Figure 6.10), the system again converges to a single trajectory, indicating that the aggregated update is applied consistently across nodes. The aggregated model shows a pronounced early instability: test loss increases from round 1 to round 2 (peaking around 0.39) before dropping sharply in round 3 and then decreasing steadily towards 0.1565 by round 10 (Table 6.2). This mirrors the transient behaviour observed in the clean FC baseline: aggregation can initially produce a model that generalises poorly, but once the local models reach a minimal competency threshold, FedAvg stabilises and yields a strong reduction in test loss. Overall, on clean test metrics (mAP and loss), the presence of the backdoor attacker is not clearly detectable.

The figures 6.11 and 6.12 show a comparison between the 4-node baseline federated learning setup and a backdoor attack targeting the `person` class. In the mAP comparison, both scenarios exhibit nearly identical performance trajectories, with the baseline achieving 5.46% mAP in `AFTER_AGGREGATION` by round 10 (Table 6.2), while the backdoor attack reaches 4.94% mAP, representing only a 9.5% relative performance reduction. The curves track closely throughout training, indicating that the backdoor attack causes only marginal degradation in overall detection performance. The test loss comparison reveals similar convergence patterns, with both scenarios experiencing an initial spike around round 2 before steadily decreasing. The backdoor attack converges to 0.1565 compared

to the baseline's 0.1534 (Table 6.2), suggesting that the attack remains relatively stealthy without significantly disrupting the global model's learning dynamics.




Figure 6.11: mAP: comparison against baseline (EIDs 2.1 vs 1.3).




Figure 6.12: Test loss: comparison against baseline (EIDs 2.1 vs 1.3).

Federated Attack: FC + FedAvg + Watermarking all classes, N=4 (EID `2.2`)

Table 6.7: Results for EID 2.2.

Node	mAP AT	mAP AA	Test Loss
$node_0$	0.02%	3.38%	0.1630
$node_1$	3.24%	3.38%	0.1630
$node_2$	3.35%	3.38%	0.1630
$node_3$	2.85%	3.38%	0.1630

This experiment extends the previous backdoor setting by applying the trigger *to all classes* instead of only targeting the *person* class. Concretely, one malicious participant poisons its local training data by inserting the same "X"-shaped watermark into every object instance, independent of its class label. In this run, the malicious node is `node_0` (blue curve).

Figure 6.13 shows a clear deviation between the malicious and benign nodes on the *clean* test set. While the three benign nodes (`node_1`, `node_2`, `node_3`) learn normally and reach 2.85–3.35% mAP by round 10 (Table 6.2), the malicious node (`node_0`, blue) remains near 0.02% mAP throughout the entire run. This indicates that poisoning all classes strongly disrupts the local optimisation of the attacker node and essentially prevents it from learning a useful detector under the chosen training budget.

Despite this extreme failure of one participant, Figure 6.14 shows that the global/aggregated model does not fully degenerate. The aggregated model reaches 3.38% mAP by round 10 (Table 6.2). Hence, FedAvg exhibits a degree of robustness in this setting: a single severely corrupted client update (here: 1/4 of participants) is not sufficient to collapse the global model on clean evaluation, likely because the benign updates dominate the average.




Figure 6.13: mAP (AT) (EID 2.2).




Figure 6.14: mAP (AA) (EID 2.2).

At the same time, compared to the clean FC baseline, the aggregated performance appears less uniform, and the presence of a non-learning client introduces additional heterogeneity in the final mAP across nodes.




Figure 6.15: Test loss (AT) (EID 2.2).




Figure 6.16: Test loss (AA) (EID 2.2).

The loss curves reinforce this interpretation. During local training (Figure 6.15), the malicious node exhibits a substantially higher and largely non-improving test loss (roughly in the 0.27–0.35 range), whereas the benign nodes decrease smoothly from about 0.22 to around 0.16 by round 10. This aligns with the near-zero mAP of the malicious node and provides a second indicator that its learned model fails to generalize to clean test data.

In `AFTER_AGGREGATION` (Figure 6.16), all nodes converge to 0.1630 by round 10 (Table 6.2), showing that the aggregated model retains good clean generalisation. Importantly, the aggregation step does not pull the entire system into the high-loss regime of the attacker. Instead, the benign majority pulls the global update towards a stable solution. Overall, this experiment suggests that while an "all-classes" trigger can completely break the local model of a malicious client on clean metrics, the federated average remains functional and does not collapse under a single malicious participant in this configuration.

The figures 6.17 and 6.18 demonstrate a comparison between the 4-node baseline and a backdoor attack targeting all object classes. Unlike the single-class attack, this broader




Figure 6.17: mAP: comparison against baseline (EIDs 2.2 vs 1.3).




Figure 6.18: Test loss: comparison against baseline (EIDs 2.2 vs 1.3).

attack shows substantially more pronounced performance degradation. The mAP comparison reveals a significant divergence between the two scenarios, with the baseline achieving 5.46% mAP in `AFTER_AGGREGATION` by round 10 (Table 6.2), while the backdoor attack on all classes reaches only 3.38% mAP, representing a performance drop of approximately 38%. This considerable gap emerges early in training and persists throughout the federated learning rounds, indicating that poisoning multiple classes creates a more detectable and disruptive attack. The test loss comparison shows both scenarios following similar convergence patterns with the characteristic spike at round 2, but the backdoor attack maintains elevated loss values throughout training, converging to 0.1630 compared to the baseline's 0.1534 (Table 6.2). The more substantial impact on mAP relative to the modest difference in loss suggests that the multi-class attack degrades the model's discriminative ability across all object categories rather than simply increasing prediction uncertainty.

Single-Node Attack: Watermarking Class `person` (EID `2.3`)




Figure 6.19: mAP (EID 2.3).




Figure 6.20: Test loss (EID 2.3).

As a further contextualisation, the attack configuration with a watermark `person` class was applied to a single node with 25% of the data available. This serves as a worst-case

reference. The poisoned samples are not diluted by aggregation and the model cannot benefit from the remaining clean data held by other participants.

Figure 6.19 and 6.20 show that this configuration yields very low absolute performance. The mean mAP remains around $\approx 2\%$ agter 10 rounds, with only a slow upward trend, while the test loss decreases slightly and then stabilises. In other words, the model learns only limited detection capability from the restricted data subset. Consequently, any attack effects in this configuration should be interpreted as an *upper bound on attack degradative influence in isolation*.

6.2.4 Attack Effectiveness

The impact of the watermarking can be analysed from a few different perspectives to get a broader sense of its impact on the overall robustness and performance. To this end, the following paragraphs evaluate how federated averaging propagates or mitigates the watermark induced adversary changes w.r.t. the poisoned class, and if the introduced watermark perturbation is considered an artefact in `AFTER_AGGREGATION`.

Impact of Federated Averaging on Poised-Class Detection. By comparing the 4 node federated baseline against a setting where one node applies watermarking to a given target class (`person`) the effects of federated averaging on the propagation or mitigation of watermarking effects can be quantified. This comparisons isolates whether the global model inherits the locally induced adversarial model updates or whether the aggregation successfully dampens these effects.

Watermark Perturbation as an Aggregation Artefact. Beyond the effect on the ground-truth, a second analysis about the watermark itself can indicate robustness of a federated approach. I.e., is the watermark with which a single node is trained transferred into the aggregated model such that it becomes a recognisable artefact. To quantify this effect, the model is evaluated `AFTER_AGGREGATION` under conditions where watermarking is applied without directly targeting (N random watermarked samples without `person`). One can then measure whether any watermark signature is retained as a systematic bias in the learned representation, indicating robustness of federated approaches. All the below experiments are conducted on a randomly chosen (seeded for reproducibility) test set of 396 images and run in evaluation mode.

Both these considerations are succinctly summarized in Table 6.8. The table reports attack effectiveness on the seeded test set (396 images – 2159 objects – 845 `person`) (EIDs 1.3, 2.1, and 2.3). *WM eval* indicates whether watermark perturbations were applied at evaluation time; *Detections* denotes the total number of matched detections; *Misclassified as* `person` counts non-`person` objects predicted as `person`; *Overall rate* reports the fraction of all non-`person` targets misclassified as `person`; and *Matched rate* reports the fraction of matched detections misclassified as `person`.

To establish a clean reference point, we first consider the *WM eval off* condition, i.e., evaluation without watermark perturbations. In this setting, the attacked federated model achieves fewer matched detections than the 4-node baseline (259 vs. 325), while exhibiting a comparable (slightly lower) matched misclassification rate (3.86% vs. 4.62%) and overall rate (0.46% vs. 0.60%). This indicates that without watermarking at evaluation time, the attack induces a reduction in the global detection performance of the aggregated model. Turning to *WM eval on*, watermark perturbations at evaluation time increase `person`-consistent confusion for both models, but more strongly for the attacked federated model. Concretely, the attacked federated model increases from 3.86% to 18.59% in matched misclassification rate (overall rate: 0.46% to 1.71%), whereas the baseline increases from 4.62% to 13.36% (overall rate: 0.60% to 1.44%). Despite this increase, the attacked federated model does not exhibit a strong watermark-consistent failure mode comparable to the locally attacked client.

The single-node reference further contextualises these effects. Locally, watermarking induces an extreme and highly distinctive behaviour. With *WM eval on*, the attacked client collapses into predicting `person` for all matched detections (misclassified: 1599; matched rate: 100%; overall rate: 74.06%), whereas without watermarking at evaluation time this failure mode is largely absent (matched rate: 1.04%).

Table 6.8: Attack effectiveness summary across baseline, attacked federated, and single-node reference models.

Network	WM eval	Detections	Misclassified as `person`	Overall rate	Misclassified rate
Baseline (EID 1.2)	off	325	15	0.60%	4.62%
	on	232	31	1.44%	13.36%
Attacked Fed (EID 2.1)	off	259	10	0.46%	3.86%
	on	199	37	1.71%	18.59%
Attacked 1 Node (EID 2.3)	off	96	1	0.05%	1.04%
	on	1599	1599	74.06%	100.00%

It is important to note that these results reflect a single experimental configuration and uses underlying models that have not been trained to full convergence. Thus, the observed robustness against artefact injection and the exhibited performance degradation are only early stage indicators, not allowing any conclusions about the asymptotic behaviour.

6.2.5 Impact of Network Topology

Having established the baseline federated performance, we now examine how different network topologies (ring, star, random) affect convergence and final performance.

Table 6.9: Results for EID 3.1.

Node	mAP AT	mAP AA	Test Loss
$node_0$	3.75%	4.87%	0.1545
$node_1$	3.16%	4.78%	0.1546
$node_2$	3.50%	4.74%	0.1546
$node_3$	3.65%	4.79%	0.1546




Figure 6.21: mAP (AT) (EID 3.1).




Figure 6.22: mAP (AA) (EID 3.1).

Federated Experiment: Ring + FedAvg, N=4 (EID `3.1`)

In the ring setting, Figure 6.21 shows that the four nodes improve gradually and in a highly similar fashion during local training, reaching 3.16–3.75% mAP by round 10 (Table 6.2). This indicates relatively small variance between nodes in terms of final performance.

In `AFTER_AGGREGATION` (Figure 6.22), the curves rise more steeply after approximately round 4 and end substantially higher than the `AFTER_TRAINING` trajectories, reaching 4.74–4.87% by round 10 (Table 6.2). A notable aspect is that the post-aggregation curves nearly overlap across nodes, suggesting that the aggregation step rapidly homogenises the node models in the ring topology, meaning that nodes become very similar after each aggregation round.

A similar pattern appears in the loss curves. During local training (Figure 6.23), the test loss decreases smoothly from around 0.22 to about 0.16, with minimal separation between nodes. In `AFTER_AGGREGATION` (Figure 6.24), there is a clear early-round instability: test loss is high in rounds 1–3 (roughly 0.36–0.38) before dropping sharply around round 4 and then converging towards 0.1545–0.1546 by the end (Table 6.2). Overall, the ring topology exhibits the same general phenomenon as in the fully connected baseline: aggregation initially destabilises the test loss, but after a few rounds leads to a better-performing and more consistent model across nodes.

The comparison between the fully connected baseline and ring topology (Figures 6.25 and 6.26) reveals that both topologies achieve comparable performance by round 10. The fully connected baseline reaches 5.46% mAP, while the ring topology achieves 4.87% mAP (Table 6.2), representing an 11% relative performance gap. The test loss trajectories show




Figure 6.23: Test loss (AT) (EID 3.1).




Figure 6.24: Test loss (AA) (EID 3.1).




Figure 6.25: mAP: comparison against baseline (EIDs 3.1 vs 1.3).




Figure 6.26: Test loss: comparison against baseline (EIDs 3.1 vs 1.3).

similar convergence patterns with characteristic early-round instability, though the ring topology takes slightly longer to stabilize (around round 5 versus round 3). Both configurations converge to nearly identical final loss values (0.1534 for baseline, 0.1545 for ring), suggesting that the ring topology's reduced connectivity primarily affects convergence speed rather than final optimisation quality.

Federated Experiment: Star + FedAvg, N=4 (EID `3.2`)

Table 6.10: Results for EID 3.2.

Node	mAP AT	mAP AA	Test Loss
$node_0$	3.48%	4.26%	0.1580
$node_1$	3.38%	4.77%	0.1557
$node_2$	3.36%	4.31%	0.1578
$node_3$	3.31%	4.33%	0.1573

For the star topology, the local-training trajectories in Figure 6.27 again show very similar




Figure 6.27: mAP (AT) (EID 3.2).




Figure 6.28: mAP (AA) (EID 3.2).

behaviour across nodes: mAP increases steadily over rounds and reaches 3.31–3.48% by round 10 (Table 6.2), with only minor divergence between nodes.

In `AFTER_AGGREGATION` (Figure 6.28), performance improves substantially compared to local training. The mAP curves rise more rapidly after round 5 and end in the range of 4.26–4.77% by round 10 (Table 6.2). Compared to the ring setting, the post-aggregation curves show slightly more separation between nodes, especially in the later rounds. This suggests that the star topology does not enforce as strong a homogenisation across node models as the ring in this run (or that nodes may effectively apply/receive the aggregated update at slightly different points in time), leading to small but visible differences in the aggregated trajectories.




Figure 6.29: Test loss (AT) (EID 3.2).




Figure 6.30: Test loss (AA) (EID 3.2).

The loss curves mirror these observations. During local training (Figure 6.29), the test loss decreases smoothly from about 0.22 towards approximately 0.16 with almost indistinguishable lines. In `AFTER_AGGREGATION` (Figure 6.30), the early-round instability reappears: losses are elevated in the first rounds (around 0.36–0.39), followed by a sharp decline between rounds 4–5. Notably, the timing of this drop differs slightly across nodes (one node remains high for an additional round), after which all curves converge and end at 0.1557–0.1580 (Table 6.2). Overall, the star topology demonstrates the same qualita-

tive benefit of FedAvg (higher mAP, lower final loss after convergence), while exhibiting slightly higher transient heterogeneity across nodes than the ring topology.




Figure 6.31: mAP: comparison against baseline (EIDs 3.2 vs 1.3).




Figure 6.32: Test loss: comparison against baseline (EIDs 3.2 vs 1.3).

The comparison between the fully connected baseline and star topology (Figures 6.31 and 6.32) shows a more pronounced performance gap than the ring topology with a 13% relative performance difference in mAP. The test loss trajectories exhibit similar early-round instability patterns, with the star topology showing a more prolonged transient phase that extends to round 5 before stabilizing. Both configurations converge to comparable final loss values, indicating that the star topology's centralised communication structure primarily impacts convergence speed and introduces slightly higher inter-node variance without fundamentally limiting final optimisation quality.

Federated Experiment: Random + FedAvg, N=4 (EID `3.3`)

Table 6.11: Results for EID 3.3.

Node	mAP AT	mAP AA	Test Loss
$node_0$	3.30%	4.89%	0.1546
$node_1$	3.67%	5.13%	0.1541
$node_2$	3.66%	3.66%	0.1615
$node_3$	3.87%	5.13%	0.1541

For the random topology, the local-training trajectories in Figure 6.33 are highly consistent across nodes. All four participants start near 0% mAP and improve steadily, with only minor divergence emerging in later rounds. By round 10, the individual nodes reach 3.30–3.87% mAP (Table 6.2), indicating that local optimisation progresses similarly across nodes when evaluated on the clean test set.

In `AFTER_AGGREGATION` (Figure 6.34), overall performance increases substantially compared to the `AFTER_TRAINING` curves, with the best nodes reaching 5.13% mAP by round 10 (Table 6.2). In contrast to the ring topology (where post-aggregation curves nearly




Figure 6.33: mAP (AT) (EID 3.3).




Figure 6.34: mAP (AA) (EID 3.3).

overlap), the aggregated trajectories in the random topology remain visibly separated: two nodes form the top-performing group at 5.13% mAP, while another reaches 4.89% mAP, and one node achieves only 3.66% mAP. This suggests that the random connectivity leads to unequal propagation of improvements across the network and thus higher inter-node variance in `AFTER_AGGREGATION`. Nevertheless, the general trend remains positive: aggregation consistently lifts the achievable mAP level beyond what any node obtains via local training alone.




Figure 6.35: Test loss (AT) (EID 3.3).




Figure 6.36: Test loss (AA) (EID 3.3).

The loss curves mirror these findings. During local training (Figure 6.35), test loss decreases smoothly and almost identically for all nodes, from about 0.22 towards approximately 0.16 by round 10, which indicates stable convergence without notable instability.

In `AFTER_AGGREGATION` (Figure 6.36), an initial transient phase is again visible: test loss is relatively high in the first rounds (around 0.35–0.38) and then drops sharply between rounds 3 and 4 to approximately 0.20. From round 5 onward, all nodes converge tightly and decrease gradually towards 0.1541–0.1615 by the end of the run (Table 6.2). Hence, as in the other federated experiments, aggregation initially introduces instability but ultimately leads to a lower loss regime. Notably, the final losses are relatively similar across most nodes, even though the aggregated mAP trajectories remain more heterogeneous in

this random topology.




Figure 6.37: mAP: comparison against baseline (EIDs 3.3 vs 1.3).




Figure 6.38: Test loss: comparison against baseline (EIDs 3.3 vs 1.3).

The comparison between the fully connected baseline and random topology (Figures 6.37 and 6.38) demonstrates performance comparable to the ring topology. The fully connected baseline achieves 5.46% mAP, while the random topology reaches 5.13% mAP for the best-performing nodes (Table 6.2), representing only a 6% relative performance difference. The test loss trajectories show similar convergence patterns with characteristic early-round instability, and both configurations converge to nearly identical final loss values (0.1534 for baseline, 0.1541 for random's best nodes). Despite the random connectivity structure, this topology achieves performance levels close to the fully connected baseline, suggesting that random edge selection can provide an efficient alternative to full connectivity while maintaining comparable optimisation quality.

6.3 Summary




Figure 6.39: Mean average precision Summary.




Figure 6.40: Test loss Summary.

Taken together, the conducted experiments highlight several consistent effects. First, the centralised setting on the full dataset (EID `1.1`) achieves the highest overall performance and the smoothest convergence, with steadily increasing mAP and steadily decreasing test loss. In the across-experiment comparison (Figure 6.39 and Figure 6.40), this run forms the *upper bound*: it reaches 9.80% mAP while maintaining the lowest loss trajectory (0.1424) throughout the later rounds (Table 6.2). This is expected, since a single model is optimized on the complete dataset without partition-induced heterogeneity or communication constraints. The partial-data baseline constitutes the centralised counterpart and thus the *lower bound*. The single-node $\frac{1}{4}$-data baseline (EID `1.2`) follows a similar qualitative learning curve but saturates substantially earlier and at a much lower level, achieving 2.85% mAP with a test loss of 0.1724 (Table 6.2). This highlights that, under the fixed training budget used in this work, the detector remains data-limited and additional rounds cannot fully compensate for reduced dataset volume.

Second, the backdoor experiments indicate that clean evaluation metrics alone are not sufficient to detect targeted attacks, but they still reveal important robustness properties. The backdoor-on-person configuration reaches 4.94% mAP with a test loss of 0.1565 (Table 6.2), representing only a 9.5% performance degradation compared to the clean fully connected baseline (5.46% mAP, 0.1534 loss). This suggests that the global model remains highly functional on clean data even with one malicious participant. In contrast, the "all-classes" backdoor is clearly more disruptive: it achieves only 3.38% mAP with a test loss of 0.1630, representing a 38% performance drop. However, the model does not collapse completely, indicating that the attack can measurably harm clean generalisation while the system retains some functionality. Importantly, none of the federated attack runs exhibits a full degeneration of the global model on clean metrics, implying a degree of resilience of FedAvg when only a single out of four participants is malicious in this setup.

Lastly, across topological variations (fully connected, ring, star, and random), FedAvg consistently improves the global/aggregated model after an initial transient phase. In Figure 6.40, all federated runs exhibit a characteristic early-round instability where the aggregated loss peaks around round 2 and then drops sharply between rounds 3 and 4, after which all curves enter a stable convergence regime. Correspondingly, Figure 6.39 shows that federated mAP curves start low and then rise steadily, reaching 4.26–5.46% by round 10 depending on topology (Table 6.2). Among these, the fully connected baseline achieves the best final mAP (5.46%), followed closely by random (5.13%), ring (4.87%), and star (4.77%). Overall, these differences suggest that topology primarily affects convergence dynamics and the rate at which information propagates, while the qualitative outcome remains stable: aggregation is beneficial once local models pass a minimal competency threshold.

Chapter 7

Discussion

This chapter synthesises the main findings of this thesis in light of the formulated research goals: (i) implementing a DFOD extension in *FLyra* and (ii) evaluating the implemented system with trivial baseline setups, under attack scenarios, and for varying topologies. Therefore, the following conclusions drawn not only reflect the algorithmic choices of the implementation but must be viewed under the light of the practical constraints and design decisions, including training horizon and available compute, as detailed in Chapter 4.

Benign Baselines and Performance Bounds. Regarding benign baselines, the preliminary experiments indicate that under the chosen training parametrization and constraints, training with a randomly initialized model is most feasible for a comparative study on DFOD, where the primary interest lies in relative performance changes across settings rather than an absolute performance benchmarking. From these baselines, a concise upper-bound and lower-bound can be extracted for federated experiments. The upper-bound is provided by the single-node, full data scenario (EID 1.1) with 9.80% mAP after 10 rounds. On the other hand, the lower bound is given by the single-node, $\frac{1}{4}$-data[1] experiment (EID 1.2) with only 2.85% mAP after 10 rounds. The federated baseline (EID 1.3) with $N = 4$ falls neatly between these bounds (5.46% mAP in `AA`). This result is consistent following a simple capacity/data argument. Each participating node sees only a subset (here $\frac{1}{4}$) of the data per round, but aggregation partially recovers full data knowledge through neighbourhood aggregation that is lost locally. This aligns directly with the under-proportional performance-drop observed in the partial data single node case, indicating that the data reduction decreases diversity but that the limited round horizon also diminishes returns for the full-data case, such that the relative gap does not scale linearly (29% performance for 25% of the data).

Federated Optimisation Dynamics. It is worth considering the overarching optimisation dynamics observed across the federated experiments. A consistent pattern emerges in the aggregated test loss. It tends to peak early (around round 2) followed by a sharp

[1] The fraction of data here is reflective of the number of nodes used in federation. A general formulation considers a $\frac{1}{N}$-data experiment as the respective baseline for N nodes.

drop before transitioning into a smoother convergence track. This behaviour is plausible considering the random initialisation of the model parameters at training start. In the first rounds, local models are still weak and heterogeneous without generalisable capabilities. Thus, parameters can diverge greatly between models leading to degenerate aggregation in these early stages. As soon as local training leads to more informative gradients, however, the individual local models appear to align sufficiently to produce a stable improved global aggregated representation. Consequently, it may be beneficial to treat early rounds differently, for example by using more conservative learning rates, warm-up schedules, or alternative aggregation strategies before switching to the default configuration.

Federated Robustness under Watermarking. Table 6.8 indicates that, for the evaluated configuration ($N = 4$ with a single malicious node), watermarking a target class (`person`) does not transfer into the aggregated model as a stable, recognisable artefact. While the attacked federated model exhibits an increase in `person`-consistent confusion under *WM eval on*, it does not reproduce the near-deterministic failure mode observed for the locally attacked client. At the same time, the attacked federated model shows a clear reduction in overall utility relative to the 4-node baseline, most prominently through reduced matched detections both with and without watermarking at evaluation time. This suggests that the malicious local updates perturb the shared parameters even when the watermark-specific signature is dampened by aggregation. Notably, watermarking at evaluation time also increases `person`-consistent confusion for the benign baseline. Since this baseline is not trained on watermarked inputs, this behaviour is best interpreted as sensitivity to a distribution shift. The introduced perturbation alters the input statistics in a way that affects the learned representation and can induce systematic confusions even in the absence of an explicit backdoor. Given the high prevalence of `person` in the dataset, such a perturbation may bias predictions towards `person` as a frequent confusion target, without implying a learned watermark-specific trigger response. With more substantial training and better generalization abilities of the models, it is likely that this behaviour would be dampened in the non-attacked baseline, making it less sensitive to such distribution shifts. However, the effects on the attacked model in federation with more training are difficult to predict, since the outcome depends on two competing dynamics without a deterministic outcome. (I) Better generalisation can reduce the distribution-shift confusions, but (II) continued malicious participation can also let the attacker's updates accumulate and remain a prevalent backdoor behaviour `AA`.

Overall, the relatively small differences between the federated baseline and the attacked federated model suggest that, under this specific setup, federated averaging dampens the adversarial effects at the global aggregated level. At the same time, it also implies limited detectability. Without access to additional signals (e.g., local update statistics or participant-level evaluation at aggregation time), it is difficult to attribute degradation or detect adversarial behaviour in the first place to the presence of a malicious node. Consequently, this is evidence of some inherent robustness in DFOD under trivial federated averaging.

Topology Influence and Inter-Node Variance. Across the evaluated topological setups, only minimal performance differences in aggregated mAP are observed, suggesting that for

$N = 4$ nodes, the topology does not materially affect optimisation but rather convergence behaviour, i.e., how quickly and how uniformly knowledge is shared. In this compute- and round-limited setting, topology therefore acts primarily as a constraint on information mixing rather than as an optimisation parameter. This effect is most visible in the random topology, which exhibits the highest inter-node variance in `AA`. A plausible explanation is position-dependent aggregation in an irregular graph. Depending on their placement and neighbourhood, some participants receive more diverse information per round, while others integrate updates more slowly. Although a connected graph is eventually mixing, i.e., information will eventually propagate in some form through federated averaging, under the short horizon considered here this position dependence can induce instability, resulting in larger inter-node variance.

Synthesis. Overall, the results show that the implemented DFOD framework yields consistent and interpretable behaviour while remaining bounded by the corresponding single-node references. Within this limited setup, the main qualitative effects arise in training dynamics and decentralised coordination rather than in absolute mAP. Aggregation exhibits early instability before stabilising, topology primarily influences information mixing and inter-node variance rather than global `AA` performance, and watermarking by a single malicious participant is dampened at the aggregated level but can not be detected with the applied aggregation scheme. At the same time, a quantitative comparison of the final mAP values to the works discussed in Chapter 3 is not feasible, since these studies typically rely on substantially larger compute budgets and longer training schedules. Further, these findings are indicative of early performance behaviours. Whether these patterns persist asymptotically is not given. Thus, due to the strong sensitivity of OD performance to training horizon, the reported metrics and interpretations in this thesis are primarily as short-horizon indicators that enable relative comparisons across DFOD settings rather than competitive absolute benchmarks. Finally, the empirical findings in this chapter should be read together with the implementation contributions described in Chapter 4, which frame all the provided data and provide a configurable foundation for further DFL studies.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

Decentralised federated learning is gaining relevance as learning is moving to the periphery, where data is privacy-sensitive, bandwidth is constrained, or the reliance on a central orchestrating entity is undesirable. This thesis explores this phenomenon with the focus on object detection as a prototypical example in machine learning, yet with limited research on decentralised cases specifically.

The work at hand addresses this gap by extending the existing *FLyra* framework with a prototypical object detection module and evaluating the resulting system under benign settings, topological variations, and backdoor attack scenarios. The evaluation shows that the federated setup exhibits behaviour consistent with intuitive bounds. Compared to a single-node full-data reference and a single-node partial-data reference, the federated configuration reaches intermediate performance within the limited training horizon. This clearly demonstrates that the aggregation partially recovers information inaccessible to any single node with only partial information. Across different tested topologies, the node neighbourhood configuration had only a minor effect on aggregated performance in terms of mAP, but it affected mixing behaviour and inter-node variance, particularly for irregular (random) or sparsely connected (star) structures. Finally, in the considered adversarial setting, a single malicious node in an otherwise benevolent setup did not lead to a stable and clearly transferable watermark signature in the aggregated model. Nevertheless, model overall performance degraded, indicating that harmful updates can perturb shared parameters even when the specific backdoor signal is weakened by aggregation.

These outcomes can be explained by few interacting factors. First, the experiments mostly capture early-stage behaviour. With short training horizons, optimisation is still in a pre-convergence phase and differences that would later smooth out can appear pronounced. Second, decentralised neighbour aggregation appears to be shaped by how quickly updates propagate through the communication graph. When connectivity is limited or mixing is uneven, information spreads more slowly and nodes can drift apart, even if the aggregated model ends up with similar performance in small-scale settings. Third, the adversarial experiments underscore two distinct effects. Federated aggregation exhibits a certain level of inherent robustness that can dilute a localised watermark signal, while the malicious updates can still introduce parameter changes that reduce overall detection performance.

While these results are well suited for controlled comparative studies of coordination and robustness, absolute conclusions about convergence performance require longer runs and broader configurations. Further, a core assumption in this work is the IID characteristic of the data over the participating nodes. This allows a strong foundation to isolate effects attributable to individual configuration options, such as the topology, but at the same time does not translate trivially to most real-life applications, as data is commonly non-IID. In addition, the evaluated federation is limited in scale and largely homogeneous, assuming stable participation and similar compute characteristics across nodes. This simplifies the analysis, but it does not capture effects introduced by instabilities in federation settings such as straggling participants. Moreover, the evaluation focuses on a single object detection architecture and dataset, which limits external validity, as DFOD behaviour may change under different models, data characteristics, or distribution shifts. Finally, the explored hyperparameter configuration is limited. Decentralised training can be sensitive to choices such as learning rate, local steps, and aggregation frequency, and with small federations and short horizons, stochastic effects can have significant impacts in these single-seed experiments.

The developed framework, however, is not inherently constrained by these limitations. Owing to its modular setup, it paves the way for a wide variety of further studies and opens the playing field for a broad range of DFOD scenarios. A few comparably low-hanging next steps within the given implementation fall into the areas of federation, optimisation, and robustness. Considering *federation*, the most immediate extensions are to scale to larger numbers of nodes (e.g., $N \in \{10, 50, 100\}$) and to run experiments to convergence, complemented by *non-IID* partitioning for better alignment with real-world data distributions. For *optimisation*, exploring alternative aggregation methods such as median- or trimmed-mean-based schemes, as well as momentum-based variants, are logical next steps to improve stability and reduce node-to-node drift. With respect to *robustness*, future work can move beyond the initial watermarking setting towards stronger attacks, including model poisoning and more diverse watermarking variants, and can incorporate mechanisms for malicious update detection to mitigate harmful contributions before they propagate through the network into the aggregated model.

Overall, this thesis provides an evaluated and validated baseline for *FLyra*-based DFOD configurations and a practical foundation for further explorations under increasingly realistic data and adversarial conditions, enabling comprehensive evaluation and targeted insights across a diverse set of DFOD settings.

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Abbreviations

AA	`AFTER_AGGREGATION`
AP	Average Precision
AT	`AFTER_TRAINING`
BCE	Binary Cross Entropy
CNN	Convolutional Neural Network
DFL	Decentralised Federated Learning
DFOD	Decentralised Federated Object Detection
EID	Experiment Identifier
FL	Federated Learning
FOD	Federated Object Detection
IoU	Intersection over Union
mAP	Mean Average Precision
ML	Machine Learning
OD	Object Detection
R-CNN	Region-based Convolutional Neural Network
SGD	Stochastic Gradient Descent
SoTA	State-of-the-art
UX	User Experience
WandB	Weights & Biases
YOLO	You Only Look Once

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Appendix A

Evaluation Metrics Continued

In the implementation of the COCO dataset, many evaluation metrics beyond Mean Average Precision and loss are provided. Since these are not considered within the experimental evaluation but are part of the code base, this chapter provides a brief overview of the omitted metrics.

A.1 Average Precision

Average Precision (AP) summarises the precision-recall trade-off. Predictions are ranked by confidence and matched to the ground truth using an IoU criterion, with the resulting true and false positives counted accordingly. This thus incorporates both classification performance and localization quality given some fixed IoU threshold.

Given the top k predictions out of N total sorted by confidence, derived via a preset IoU threshold T, then with precision P_k and recall R_k a discrete formulation of AP$[T]$ is

$$\mathrm{AP}[T] \approx \sum_{k=1}^{N} \big(R_k - R_{k-1}\big)\, P_k$$

The evaluation provides the results for both AP50 and AP75.

A.2 Average Recall

Average Recall (AR) summarizes the recall performance of a detector, focusing on how many ground-truth objects are retrieved rather than the full precision–recall trade-off. Predictions are ranked by confidence and matched to ground truth using an IoU threshold. Recall is then computed as the fraction of ground-truth instances that have at least one matching prediction. In the COCO protocol, AR is averaged over multiple IoU thresholds

and is reported under a limit on the maximum number of detections per image, which reflects different detection budgets.

With $T = \{0.50, 0.55, \ldots, 0.95\}$ the set of IoU thresholds and $R(c, t, n)$ the recall for class c at threshold t and allowing at most n detections per image:

$$\mathrm{AR}[n] = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{C}|} \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \frac{1}{|T|} \sum_{t \in T} R(c, t, n).$$

The evaluation provides the results for different detection budgets: AR1, AR10, and AR100.

Appendix B

Experiment to Scenario ID Mapping

The below shows a mapping from EID to scenario ID. The scenario ID corresponds to the raw data ID assigned by *FLyra*. These can be used to refer to the original runs in the code and data repositories (see. Appendix C). Preliminary trial and error runs were not persisted.

Table B.1: Mapping from experiment IDs to scenario IDs.

ID	Scenario ID	Title
Baselines		
1.1	6960bbf6710145d59b98b447	Centralised Baseline: Fixed LR
1.2	69636c69b688111c815dfcb0	Centralised Baseline: Data Fraction $\frac{1}{4}$
1.3	6960bb77b688111c81565034	Federated Baseline: FC + FedAvg, $N = 4$
Attacks		
2.1	6963b56c710145d59b9fae29	Backdoor (Class=`person`, 1 malicious node), $N = 4$
2.2	69652dd6710145d59ba4af53	Backdoor (Class=all, 1 malicious node), $N = 4$
2.3	6973302e981ab9a764d26473	Backdoor (Class=`person`, 1 malicious node), $N = 1$
Topology		
3.1	69621754b688111c815a26eb	Federated Topology: Ring + FedAvg, $N = 4$
3.2	6962168c710145d59b9b56a0	Federated Topology: Star + FedAvg, $N = 4$
3.3	69653001b688111c815ef195	Federated Topology: Random + FedAvg, $N = 4$

Appendix C

Project Code and Installation Guidelines

Please refer to the `README.md` documents in the respective repositories for comprehensive instructions on installation and configuration. In general, all experimental runs can be configured and executed with the code in as-is state. For more comprehensive evaluations and specific analytics with no general applicability, minor tweaks were introduced in the *watermarking* evaluation, available in a participant branch named respectively (`watermarking_evaluation`). Access to the code and data repositories can be requested via the Communication Systems Group at the University of Zurich.

The code is divided into four core repositories.

- `FLyra-coordinator`: Core implementation element one with the run configuration and simulation backbone.
- `FLyra-participant`: Core implementation element two with the object detection implementation added.
- `checkpoints`: Contains no inherent logic but solely the checkpoints of the experiments (excluding EID 2.3 - since only supplementary as a lower bound).
- `analysis`: Contains the code relevant for visualisations of WandB runs.

Appendix D

Gen AI Declarations

In preparing this work, we employed ChatGPT (v5.2), Claude 4.5 Sonnet, Google Gemini 3, and DeepL for paraphrasing, rewording, and text translation. We also accepted some of the Overleaf's built-in assistant's suggestions. All outputs were reviewed and edited by the authors, who take full responsibility for the final content of the publication.